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 Abstract 
Euthanasia is a practice that has taken place since immemorial times. And 
since immemorial times it has been controversial and a source of harsh de-
bates. Throughout the last decades, many changes have been introduced in this 
field and many practices, until then only taking place without public knowl-
edge, were progressively revealed and regulated. 
This paper aims, firstly, at clarifying the terminology and concepts usually 
used in the euthanasia debate and presenting, in a lucid way, the arguments 
that civic movements and authors resort to when defending or criticising the 
liberalisation of euthanasia. Secondly, it describes the legal and social situation 
regarding euthanasia in several countries, where cases and legislation have 
demanded greater awareness from society. Thirdly, it attempts to compare the 
different national situations previously analysed. Finally, it discusses ways of 
improving the present situation and finding better solutions for the regulation 
of euthanasia. 
In such a debate, where moral, ethic and religious arguments and beliefs are 
called upon, it is crucial not to lose sight of the foundations of our culture(s) 
and society(ies). Therefore, this paper, although concentrating on the legal as-
pects of this debate, tries to take into account of some non-legal aspects which 
are also relevant and without which it is not possible to thoroughly discuss this 
issue. Ultimately, this paper does not attempt to portray a neutral position, 
since legal scholars should not necessarily limit themselves to technical and 
cold analysis of legal provisions. 
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I. And now, Ladies and Gentlemen… 
… Euthanasia. The last few months have brought this issue to the public arena 
in an acute way more than ever before. Several events have triggered a very 
strong and emotional discussion on euthanasia. The French Senate approved a 
law regarding the rights of patients and the end of life, which according to 
many was a big step towards legalising euthanasia. Two powerful and touching 
movies depicting the life and death of the Spaniard Ramon Sampedro (“Mar 
adentro”1) and American Maggie Fitzgerald (“One million dollar baby”2) were 
released and hit the screens in 2004. Finally, and most importantly, the death 
of the American Terri Schiavo became the daily soap opera in the houses of 
many families all over the world. All these events, of course, only gained the 
repercussion that they have because the necessary social and cultural condi-
tions exist. Among these, one can point out some: the individualism that char-
acterises our society; the role of mass media; our tendency, on one hand, to 
deny death, and on the other hand, to try to control it; the trending legalism of 
all issues that somehow affect our lives; and the rising competition between 
different world views.3 
                                                 
* All Internet websites indicated in this work were last checked on 4 November 2005. 
1  “Mar adentro” (“The sea inside”), 2004, directed by Alejandro Amenábar and starring 
Javier Bardem and Belén Rueda: “the real-life story of Spaniard Ramon Sampedro, 
who fought a 30 year campaign in favour of euthanasia and his own right to die”,   
<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0369702/>. 
2  “One million dollar baby”, 2004, directed by Clint Eastwood and starring Clint East-
wood, Hilary Swank and Morgan Freeman: “a hardened trainer-cum-manager works 
with a determined woman in her attempt to establish herself as a boxer”,<http://www. 
imdb.com/title/tt0405159/>. 
3  These, and some other causes (such as fear, materialism and consumerism, mystery 
and impact of scientific advances) are mentioned by M. Sommerville, in “Death talk: 
the case against euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide”, McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, Montreal et. al., 2001, pp. 105-118. Although the selection of societal and 
cultural causes indicated by this author seem, in fact, to have contributed to the crea-
tion of the necessary ground for the debate on euthanasia to become so lively, we do 
not agree with the negative evaluation that she does from them. In fact, individualism 
does have the merits of providing the necessary space to individuals to pursue their 
happiness and not be oppressed by communitarian wishes or intentions; mass media 
have an indisputably valuable importance in providing a great audience access to 
many relevant issues and information; although legalism, taken to its extremes, con-
tributes to an even more complex and litigious society, it is understandable and re-
spectable that individuals feel the need to call for legal rules and court decisions to 
protect their rights that are not recognised in practice; etc. Therefore, although we do 
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We therefore find it a opportune moment now to revisit basic notions re-
lated thereto and to make a comparative analysis of the present legal regime of 
euthanasia in several countries in Europe and elsewhere, as well as to try to see 
how the public awareness and perception of the problem developed in the last 
years. We have adopted an interdisciplinary approach, embracing legal, socio-
logical and criminological policy aspects. We have refrained from describing 
in much detail each argument or legal regime, in order to maintain a workable 
overview of the complete problematic. Additionally, we believe that, in re-
gards to such a complex and sensitive issue such as euthanasia, it is more im-
portant to collect different perspectives that allow us to enrich the analysis, 
rather than describing in detail legal technicalities that only render the debate 
more difficult. Finally, we thought it more valuable to concentrate our efforts 
in pointing out the latest legal, as well as social, developments, and make sev-
eral proposals de iure condendo, rather than exhaustively listing de iure con-
dito solutions. 
The image that first comes to mind when talking about euthanasia is defi-
nitely the one of the person who, due to his/her degenerating body, is no longer 
able to conduct a satisfactory life. All the new dimensions that death and the 
process of dying have gained in the last few decades force people into very 
complicated medical decisions, which also increase the number of persons who 
are sensitive and sympathetic to the idea of voluntary euthanasia. In fact, the 
most modern life sustaining and reanimation methods have come to prolong life 
beyond any forecast, leading to unexpected and negative consequences: pro-
longing of suffering in case of terminal illnesses, maintenance of life under very 
diminished or inexistent conscience, and a whole range of conditions considered 
by many not worth to be lived.4 These may derive from traumatic head (brain 
and skull) injuries causing, e.g., irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state. 
These medical conditions lead, in the words of Defanti,5 to the dissociation of 
the biological life (which persists) from the psychological life (which disap-
pears), making people ask themselves if using reanimation therapies is always 
opportune. This scenario has also lead an increasing number of people to think 
of “mercy killing” as an act of compassion, an excusable murder. 
“Euthanasia” derives from the Greek, meaning “good or easy death” (“eu”, 
which is good, and “thanasia”, which is death). It has come to mean acting or 
withholding action so that someone else will die under circumstances in which 
                                                                                                                                                      
find very pertinent the causes pointed out by this author for the growing desire to le-
galise euthanasia, we do not share her pessimistic interpretation of the same.  
4  See C.A. Defanti, “Eutanasia, cambiamenti e norme”, in “Una norma giuridica per la 
bioetica”, a cura di Cosimo Marco Mazzoni, il Mulino, Bologna, 1998, pp. 237-250. 
5  Ibidem, p. 239. 
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death would be a benefit to that person him/herself. The word “euthanasia” 
was actually invented in the XVII century, by the philosopher Francis Bacon, 
in his “Novum Organum”. In this book, he defended the position that the doc-
tor’s function was not only to cure, but also to allow for an easy and sweet 
death. In 1794, the Prussian Code was the first one to approach the question, 
condemning anyone who committed euthanasia as a murderer. The Norwegian 
Penal Code of 1902 also considered euthanasia specifically, deciding on the 
sentence reduction. The Russian Penal Code of 1922, which only lasted for 4 
years, went further than any other, allowing euthanasia. Organized movements 
to legalise voluntary euthanasia started in England, with the Voluntary Eutha-
nasia Legislation Society, in 1935. Later, the legislation of Uruguay and Co-
lombia6 also predicted impunity in certain cases of euthanasia. Codes like the 
Greek (1950) or Filipino ones only allowed for sentence reduction instead. In 
1962, a Japanese court even clearly set down the criteria for legal euthanasia.7 
The ever-growing possibility of prolonging life to an extent in which the pa-
tients themselves believe that life is not a benefit demanded the reconsideration 
of legalising euthanasia. Still, it is a repugnant idea to many people, either be-
cause they relate it to unjust killing, condemned by western civilization, or to 
nazi-kind of programs. Of course that even just considering the question rises a 
never ending number of problems: Who can make the decision (doctors, rela-
tives, the patient)? When does consent have to be given. How to administer 
euthanasia? Does it not imply too many risks in what regards family and soci-
ety’s pressure? Etc. 
                                                 
6  In May 1997, the Columbian Constitutional Court declared euthanasia lawful, con-
cluding that the fundamental rights to a life of dignity and to protection of the inde-
pendence of the individual did not allow for punishment of the assisted suicide. Arti-
cle 326 of the Colombian Criminal Code regarding compassionate homicide was, 
therefore, inapplicable to physicians assisting terminally ill patients wishing to die. 
Some authors have, however, asked for a careful analysis of the fact that Colombia 
has one of the world’s highest rates of homicide (along with South Africa and Russia). 
See Judgement of 20 May 1997, Action for constitutional review brought by José 
Eurípides Parra Parra, cit. in Communication no. 1024/2001, Sanles Sanles v. Spain, 
(Decision adopted on 30 March 2004, eightieth session), in Report of the Human 
Rights Committee (Volume II), Seventy-ninth session (20 October-7 November 
2003), Eightieth session (15 March-2 April 2004), Eighty-first session (5-30 July 
2004),<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/f0c6766939e65645c1256ffd0024998f/$FI
LE/G0443700.pdf>, p. 510, and in Público, 11 April 2001. 
7  Decision of the Nagoya Court of Appeals, High Court Criminal Reports, Vol. 15, No. 
9, p. 674 (Dec. 22, 1962), cit. in M. Fukuda, “A survey Research of Doctors Attitudes 
Toward Euthanasia in Boston and in Tokyo”, in Osaka University Law Review, No. 
22, 1975, pp. 19-77. 
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II. Clarifying Concepts and Precising Terminology 
We should right away distinguish euthanasia as we defined it above from other 
completely different behaviours: the so-called eugenic and economical eutha-
nasia. The first one aims at selection in order to eliminate the weak and handi-
capped from the society, thus improving the human species. The second one 
believes in eliminating all people, sick or old, incapable of taking care of them-
selves, getting rid of this financial burden of families and society. In any case, 
the correct understanding of euthanasia as it is discussed today has nothing to 
do with any of these. Political programs of race improvement or savage eco-
nomical directives are in no way connected to allowing terminally ill patients 
in extreme pain to die in a dignified way.  
Defining “death” is also relevant, even if only indirectly, to this discussion. 
External observation (breathing, self-consciousness, pulse, etc.) and heart-
arrest for an irreversible time were the two criteria used to define death until a 
few years ago. Nowadays the brain-death criterion is the one followed in gen-
eral medical practice. It means that death is declared when machines cannot 
register the slightest brain activity. Only knowing when we can talk about 
death makes it possible to consider certain reanimating techniques ethically 
obsolete or not, establishing the duty of care and life-saving treatment, etc. 
Several concepts and terminology rise frequently in this debate, therefore, 
we shall proceed with making clear the meaning given to those, before we fur-
ther use them in the comparative analysis of the rules applying to euthanasia in 
different jurisdictions. When talking about euthanasia, it is usual to distinguish 
between passive and active euthanasia.8 It amounts to the question of whether 
killing is actually worse than letting die. Criminal Law tends to accept and act 
according to a different judgement of the same result depending on the fact 
that originated it: the agent is often more severely punished for an action than 
an omission. Therefore, passive euthanasia, which consists of ceasing or not 
starting life-saving treatment, usually deserves a milder punishment than active 
euthanasia, which can be defined as the specific intervention of a third person 
with the aim of ending someone’s life. The first one includes not treating se-
verely deformed neo-born babies and retrieving heart, kidney or lung support. 
The second one consists normally of a lethal injection. It remains, however, to 
                                                 
8  See Council of Europe (COE), “Replies to the questionnaire for member states relating 
to euthanasia”, <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-operation/Bioethics/ 
Activities/Euthanasia/Answers%20Euthanasia%20Questionnaire %20E%2015Jan03. 
asp#TopOfPage>. This document provides the definition of these concepts in each 
member state of the COE, being these always very close to the ones provided by us.  
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be proved that there is actually a real difference between these two ‘forms’ of 
euthanasia: Where does one end and the other one start? What reason is there 
to think that it is less ethically unacceptable to let a baby in extreme pain for 
several days in a row until he/she dies than terminate his/her life with a lethal 
injection? Not doing anything is already doing something; it is deciding what 
to do, just as taking an action. As Defanti, a physician himself, defends, the 
decision to not resort to a life sustaining mean or to suspend it after its use has 
started cannot be considered a mere case of omission, for it is already a deci-
sion.9 Therefore, we believe that omissions and actions should, as far as the 
euthanasia debate is concerned, deserve the same punishment. For the sake of 
coherence, the law should determine the same solution for both passive and ac-
tive euthanasia. Besides, the active intervention, such as administering a lethal 
drug that interrupts both (unbearable) pain and life immediately, is more bene-
ficial for the patient than the passive waiting for a death which in many cases 
is a long, useless agony.10  
Another common distinction is the one between ordinary and extraordi-
nary medical means. The first ones would be of current use and proportionate 
efforts and the second ones would demand for extreme situations and dispro-
portionate actions. Some authors accept more easily the suspension of extraor-
dinary means of treatment rather than of ordinary means. However, it is obvi-
ous, especially to medical care professionals, that this is an excessively am-
biguous distinction, mostly because all means to save life are considered, at 
least ideally, ordinary for hospitals. This distinction is also extremely hard if 
we realise that what were unusual means little time ago are today common 
practice in any hospital and that what is extraordinary in certain cases is ordi-
nary for others and vice-versa.11 
Finally, the concept of indirect euthanasia is also used in medical and legal 
texts. Indirect euthanasia means causing death through the prescription of drugs 
that, even if only aimed at making pain bearable, have the effect of knowingly 
accelerating the moment of decease. It is what one can call ‘accepted secondary 
effect’ of the fight against pain. Providing large doses of painkillers, even when 
                                                 
9  C.A. Defanti, op. cit., p. 245; M. Casado Gonzalez, “La eutanasia: Aspectos éticos y 
jurídicos”, REUS, S.A., Madrid 1994, pp. 19-22 and 25. Of the same opinion, calling 
the distinction between active and passive euthanasia a mere appearance and not fun-
damental, see Y. Kenis, “L’euthanasie et l’opinion publique – Un divorce entre les 
médecins et la société?”, in: Pinsart M.-G. et Susanne C. (éds.), L'euthanasie ou la 
mort assistée, Bruxelles, De Boeck, 1991, pp. 35-43. 
10  C.A. Defanti, op. cit., pp. 246; L. Schwarzenberg, “Penser l’euthanasie”, in Pinsart 
M.-G. et Susanne C. (éds.), op. cit., pp. 89-97, especially p. 96. 
11  For more details, see M. Casado Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
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it leads to shortening the life of the patient, is expressly allowed in countries 
such as Albania, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Switzerland.12 
All these distinctions end up having no value in assessing a certain treatment 
as compulsory or voluntary. At the end, they lack clarity and become irrelevant. 
Moreover, this remains true no matter what final solution we defend for eutha-
nasia. Nevertheless, a fundamental distinction can be drawn: voluntary and 
non-voluntary euthanasia. This is the definitely crucial distinction we have to 
draw, when making legislative decisions. It is according to this classification 
that we can make a clear moral and ethical evaluation of the admissibility of 
euthanasia. We should, therefore, consider these kinds of euthanasia: 
Voluntary: one person helps another one in putting an end to his/her life 
according to his/her request and/or will (in which we could include the physi-
cian-assisted suicide and most cases of active and passive euthanasia); 
Non-voluntary: the patient cannot at the present and did not previously ex-
press consent nor will as to whether he/she would like to live or die (where we 
can also include some cases of active and passive euthanasia). 
This is the most relevant classification as to decide on whether we should 
allow euthanasia, and which kind, or not. Once again, there is no room for 
eugenics, murder, genocide or arbitrary destruction of the sick, deformed, se-
nile or mentally deficient. Only the possibility of permitting each person to die 
in a painless and dignified way is at stake, not the hideous intention of human 
disposal. 
III. The Different Sides of the Barricade 
The issue of euthanasia can be reduced to three main moral and judicial values: 
– the necessity for reducing physical pain of terminally ill patients;  
– the necessity for rendering possible the freedom of choice of the termi-
nally ill patients in defining their remaining days; 
– the necessity of assuring the right to life of the terminally ill patients. 
It is, therefore, an extremely complex task to satisfy all of these interests: how 
to protect both people’s lives and let them choose their own end? If we decide 
that it is better to die than to go on living, we are also saying that life quality is 
more important than life quantity. It is, therefore, the right to life and the con-
                                                 
12  See COE, op. cit. 
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ception we have of it that is going to determine in great part the final solution 
we give to the problem. If we can destroy life to guarantee the security of other 
juridical values, than we make life a relative value, not absolute as so many au-
thors consider it. However, if we already oppose to life other values as self-
defence, why not oppose it also to life quality, the will of living or the self-
determination right? If we consider the right to life as entitling people to: 
– their bare minimum needs for continued life, whatever that may require, 
as long as it does not violate anyone else’s similar right and there are 
available resources; and,  
– protection against unjust assault or interference with these vital interests; 
then, there is no conflict between the right to life and beneficent euthanasia, 
whatever form it may take. Let us then review the main arguments usually 
evoked in favour and against voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia.  
A. Voluntary Euthanasia13 
Voluntary euthanasia refers specifically to the right of the adult person who is 
in command of his/her faculties to have his/her life ended by a third person, 
pursuant to his/her own intelligent request, under specific conditions pre-
scribed by law, and by painless means. We can, therefore, infer that voluntary 
euthanasia involves at least two willing persons: the patient and the person 
who assists him/her, which means that it is also a voluntary action to the per-
son assisting. Voluntary euthanasia is then basically equivalent to physician-
assisted suicide, where are implicated adult persons who have a serious physi-
cal illness that is both incurable and terminal, and which causes severe distress 
to the patient or renders him/her incapable of leading a meaningful existence. 
Still, some authors insist in separating voluntary euthanasia from physician-
assisted suicide, saying that in the second one, as opposed to the first one, the 
element of killing is absent, the main idea is helpfulness and only doctors can 
do it. It is obvious, however, that there is no solid reasoning for this affirma-
tion. Besides that, this brings us back to the distinction between passive and 
active euthanasia, which we have already considered unjustified and irrelevant. 
Both distinctions (voluntary euthanasia vs. physician assisted suicide and ac-
tive vs. passive euthanasia) are aimed at prohibiting one and allowing the 
other, which opens unbearable breaches on any possible coherent regulation of 
                                                 
13  For a more exhaustive review of all arguments involved in the voluntary euthanasia 
debate, see main bibliography listed at the end of the text. See also, M. Otlowski, 
“Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law”, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 
187-256. 
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euthanasia, as stated previously. 
In any case, the mere will of the patient should not be enough for euthana-
sia to take place; it should be carefully controlled by a statute and allowed only 
under rigorously defined circumstances. These can differ from proposal to 
proposal and from law to law, therefore, we will not discuss them all in detail, 
but, still, we will discuss the general arguments usually raised. It should be 
clear that all religious grounds and arguments have to be set apart and ignored, 
whether they are against or for legalising voluntary euthanasia. Voluntary 
euthanasia legislation must stand or fall on its own secular merits, never on its 
religious acceptability or repugnance.  
Voluntary euthanasia can find justification in reference to three basic values: 
1) Prevention of Cruelty: Laws forbidding euthanasia are cruel, as they 
require a person to be kept alive against his/her will, while denying his/her 
pleas for merciful death and letting him/her decay for a long period. The legal 
system lacks compassion and mercy should dictate intervention under request 
to provide relief, even if it brings death. Far from being immoral or unethical 
to accede to such a request, it is cruel to stand by without coming to the aid of 
the person pleading for the end. 
2) Allowance of Liberty (principle of autonomy and respect for self-de-
termination): We should start with the assumption that all voluntary acts are 
permissible and, in absence of some legitimate reason to deny it, we would 
presume that a doctor and a patient are free to act as they wish.14 In a free so-
ciety, it is the restraint on liberty that must be justified, not the possession of 
liberty. Therefore, law has to demonstrate the necessity of repressing the doc-
tor and patient’s conducts on social grounds. What secular social interest is so 
compelling that justifies preventing the incurably ill sufferer from exercising 
his/her liberty of choice to accelerate death? In addition, if one accepts the pa-
tient’s right to freely choose to die in suicide, what ethical or moral drawback 
can there be in the exercise of such a right if the choice is merely executed by 
another? After the decision of death, what can be wrong in asking another per-
son to assist in carrying out this legitimate choice or in accepting such request? 
Individual autonomy is essential in bio-ethics and law. Therefore, it is funda-
mental to respect it whenever truly voluntary consent is given and no abuse or 
                                                 
14  For more developments on the historical and philosophical grounds of the rational 
perspective of a ‘right over life’, based on the thought of Locke and Hobbes, see F. 
Cavalla, “Diritto alla vita e diritto sulla vita”, Rivista internazionale di filosofia del 
diritto, IV Serie, LXV, 1998, Giuffrè Editore, pp. 16-31. The author, however, reaches 
rather unpredictable and unreasonable conclusions, understandingly and admittedly 
influenced by Roman Catholic roots.  
  9
harm to third persons is caused.15 
3) Enhancement of Human Dignity: Allowing for freedom and preventing 
cruelty would let patients control their own death, enhancing their dignity, 
since it would allow the sufferer to receive a merciful death and not endure 
pointless pain.16 
Of course, there are also very strong arguments to ground objection to the 
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia: 
1) No Ethical Value of Consent: This argument accepts the right of the pa-
tient to refuse treatment, but never the possibility of the doctor assisting at sui-
cide. No ethical or lawful legitimacy would derive from the patient’s consent 
                                                 
15  For a thorough and interesting account of the most important considerations arising 
from the principle of autonomy and respect for self-determination, namely problems 
related to informed consent, medical care personnel own autonomy and self-
determination and the role and importance of living wills, see H. Biggs, “Euthanasia, 
death with dignity and the law”, Hart Publishing, Oxford et. al. 2001, pp. 95-144. 
16  Concerning this argument, Montero claims that it transforms the concept of dignity 
more diffuse, mostly subjective and relative, and places it closer to the concept of 
‘quality of life’. He defends, instead, a universal concept of dignity, applicable to all 
humans (E. Montero, “Vers une légalisation de l’euthanasie volontaire? Réflexions à 
propos de la these de l’autonomie”, Cahiers de la faculté de droit de Namur, 3, 1998). 
In fact, the concept of dignity in present western societies has become more ‘demand-
ing’, does not seem to be so universal as it was probably thought to be. The concept of 
‘dignity’ has most likely always been very much dependent on specific cultural con-
texts, and the fact that the modern western societies place so much value on individu-
als and self-determination might explain why life’s dignity might signify and require 
different things for different individuals. There is, then, a subjective concept of dig-
nity. In fact, as Otlowski underlines, “it is through the recognition of the principle of 
self-determination that respect is shown for individuals and human dignity is pro-
moted”, i.e., the concept of dignity deals with “power to control important aspects of 
one’s life including matters of life and death”, which does “in no way purports to deny 
the intrinsic worth and dignity of all human beings regardless of their health or condi-
tion” (M. Otlowski, op. cit., pp. 205-206). See also, H. Biggs, op. cit., pp. 145-174. 
The author examines how euthanasia may enhance a dignified death and stresses out 
that, due to the legal prohibition of euthanasia, its practice creates undignified implica-
tions both for patients as well as for physicians who engage in it (such as court judg-
ments, violation of professional ethics and feelings of guilt). The author defends, 
therefore, that a “gradual relaxation of the present legal restrictions could facilitate a 
highly regulated system of medically assisted dying for those who require it, while 
providing a high level of protection for everybody” (p. 173). For an interesting analy-
sis of the concept of dignity in the field of biomedicine, see A. Krajewska, “Funda-
mental Rights Concerning Biomedicine in the Constitutional Treaty and Their Effect 
on the Diverse Legal Systems of Member States”, <http://www.germanlawjournal. 
com/article.php?id=666>. 
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or request since suicide remains an individual and non-delegable act. Never-
theless, the right to self-determination so fiercely protected by nowadays soci-
ety makes one wonder if there is not enough ethical ground to the legal value 
of consent to euthanasia. 
2) Difficulty of determining voluntary consent: In many cases it will be 
impossible to make sure that consent is truly voluntary since the patient will be 
in great distress due to the pain or stupefied by drugs. However, all consent 
given by the patient while still in a rational and sane state, before any extreme 
distress caused by pain or stupefaction due to drugs, escapes this argument. It 
is sufficient, therefore, to require that a patient execute a formal document de-
claring his/her desire for euthanasia. If the statute legalising voluntary euthana-
sia demands this kind of document, truly voluntary consent would be satisfac-
torily obtained and guaranteed. This kind of previously written consent is usu-
ally called living will, where patients can: refuse caring medicine and/or pallia-
tive care (as opposed to curative medicine and efficient treatment) or life-
saving treatment, ask for the use of all possible means to diminish the pain and 
even ask for active euthanasia as a last resort.17  
3) Risk of Incorrect Medical Diagnosis: This argument only makes sense 
if euthanasia is administered well before the final stages of the incurable and 
terminal disease, before the nature of the disease becomes patently clear and 
death inevitable. However, euthanasia is by principle to be administered by 
physicians only as a last resort, after the final progression of the disease has 
become evident. Of course, there is the possibility that doctors, as any other 
professional in other field, might produce a mistaken diagnosis. Still, this hap-
pens also in any other medical diagnosis concerning any other case (including 
with possible lethal effects). In any case, the demand for a second physician’s 
opinion (a consultant) certifying that the patient really suffers from an incur-
able terminal condition would greatly diminish this risk and, therefore, weaken 
this argument. 
4) Possibility of new medical discoveries: If accepted, this argument 
would implicate leaving all presently dying patients to the mere chance of a fu-
ture medical innovation that would eventually make possible that patient’s 
cure. However, first of all, we cannot forget that the relevant moment would 
not even be the discovery of a new cure, but its availability to general use. 
Secondly, when a patient requires euthanasia and it can be considered accept-
able, he/she is definitely suffering from an incurable terminal disease that has 
                                                 
17  For more explanations on the impact of such legal instruments, see N.L. Cantor, “The 
Permanently Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia”, American Journal 
of Law & Medicine, Volume XV, Number 4, 1989, pp. 381-437 (especially 398-410). 
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also reached its last stages and is suffering from great pain and distress. There-
fore, when euthanasia is administered, the progression of the fatal disease will 
have weakened or impaired the patient’s body processes to such an extent that 
any new medical discovery, even if immediately available for use, would be of 
little aid to him/her. 
5) The Use of Modern Drugs to Control Pain Obviates the Need for Re-
sort to Voluntary Euthanasia: This argument relies on the pain-controlling ca-
pacities of modern drugs. However, no painkillers prevent people from realising 
their artificial and hopeless condition, nor does it put an end to all the suffering 
felt by terminally ill patients, especially being aware of their impending deaths. 
6) The Slippery Slope Objection: This argument consists of not innovat-
ing because we do not know what its consequences will be. Therefore, volun-
tary euthanasia should not be legalised because other worse practices (murder, 
genocide, etc.) could then follow. However, firstly, no legal proposal, espe-
cially the most important ones, escapes this kind of pessimistic prediction. 
Secondly, this argument is not addressed at the merits of voluntary euthanasia 
itself, but at a catastrophic parade of supposedly following horrors. In our 
opinion, this objection only aims at installing confusion in the discussion by 
introducing irrational and irrelevant concerns about unethical practices. It es-
pecially mixes voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Even if caution is un-
doubtedly justified when introducing serious legal changes (as in the case of 
legalising addictive drugs, relaxing child labour laws or allowing for less pro-
tection against censorship), the risks here discussed are definitely rhetorical 
and the warnings are needless since carefully tested safeguards can be created. 
The line between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia and between euthanasia 
and practices such as murder or genocide is certainly clear enough in order not 
to let any space for posterior abusive interpretations.18 
                                                 
18  For a reasonable and moderate analysis of the slippery slope argument, although not 
entirely accurate in our opinion, see K. Amarasekara and M. Bagaric, “Euthanasia, 
morality and the law”, Peter Lang, New York et al. 2002, pp. 63-72. The authors dis-
cuss the results of surveys conducted in the Netherlands and Australia, which con-
cluded that the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia is higher in Australia than in the 
Netherlands, although euthanasia is prohibited in the former and legal in the later. 
Some authors have, therefore, concluded that “there are greater risks inherent in the 
current laws which hold active euthanasia to be illegal, but which are in practice 
flouted, than exist when genuine attempts are made to control and regulate the practice 
as has occurred in the Netherlands” (M. Otlowski, “Voluntary Euthanasia and the 
Common Law”, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. xiv). K. Amarasekara and M. Ba-
garic, however, have found this conclusion to fail on grounds of the non-prosecution 
policy followed in Australia in these cases, which, in fact, makes the Australian legal 
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Considering all these arguments, we can reach the conclusion that most ob-
jections to voluntary euthanasia fail on analysis and a properly drafted law can 
meet those that have some force. It is, therefore, not enough to just oppose 
euthanasia. Considering the suffering of the people who reach the radical point 
of asking for his/her own death, should one not do much more to respect their 
choice to refuse treatment or speed their own death? 
B. Non-Voluntary Euthanasia 
This constitutes the most complex issue in the euthanasia discussion. This kind 
of euthanasia concerns several categories of people, including: 
a) persons who could have previously decided if they wanted or not eutha-
nasia to be administered to them, but, because of loss of mental or physi-
cal capacities, ended up not expressing their will (vegetative chronicle 
states, life-supported patients); 
b) persons who never had the ability or the capacity to make such option 
since they were never in possession of the necessary faculties (babies, 
deeply incapacitated persons). 
As for the cases included under a), if the patients had used living wills, their 
will would have been stated and should be respected, at least as far as the in-
formed consent requirements could be proven to have been satisfied. We 
would be dealing with a voluntary euthanasia case, even if the patient had 
fallen into a vegetative state. As for the people who actually fall under a), for 
not having expressed their will, we should start by referring that most of these 
cases have to do with caring medicine: most doctors take as their motto doing 
everything within their reach to preserve life, even if a vegetative one, while 
families and other medical personnel many times question this blind persever-
ance. Caring medicine and palliative care in general have no therapeutic value, 
since it only consists of artificially prolonging life when there is no more pos-
sibility of cure or even improvement. 
The chronic vegetative cases have to be very carefully diagnosed, since in a 
few cases the neurological symptoms may be confused with vegetative states: 
locked-in syndrome, neo-cortical death, brain death, etc. In order to assure an 
accurate diagnosis, some medical teams propose a reasonable waiting period (1 
year) after which it would be permissible to talk about chronic and irreversible 
vegetative states. What is at stake here is very often the possibility to renounce 
caring medicine and/or palliative care: should it be legal for a patient’s family 
                                                                                                                                                      
practice similar to the Dutch one.  
  13
or/and doctor to renounce caring treatment/artificially-supported life? Most 
medical teams and families already agree in not pursuing any further medical 
care and administering euthanasia to patients in a chronic vegetative state or 
depending on life-supporting machines. Of course, that common practice does 
not justify by itself its legalisation, but the truth is that maintaining vegetative 
‘lives’ in hospital beds for months and years is purely hopeless and distressing 
for everyone dealing with the situation. 
As for the cases included under b), decisions about the use of surgery 
and/or life-support systems for prolonging or improving the lives of defective 
newborns or deeply incapacitated adults with medical serious complications 
are normally made by parents or closest family together with their doctors and 
eventually the consultation of the hospital ethics committee. Many consider 
this a violation of the right to life of every infant and adult. However, is there 
really a right to life-sustaining treatment in all cases? Firstly, ‘negative effects’ 
of an impaired child or adult in other people’s lives (family, society) should 
not deserve any consideration. Secondly, prospective handicaps should not re-
ceive these treatments only if the disability at stake or its treatment is so severe 
that their lengthening has no net benefit for the patient. Within these two re-
strictions, a decision about life-sustaining supports is to be made by the parents 
and physicians if they agree, and by a hospital board or court if they do not. 
Let us now look at the actual situation of the legal regulation of euthanasia 
at the international and national levels, in several countries and regions of the 
world. We will begin with looking into the contribution of the Council of 
Europe and the European Union to this debate. Then we will illustrate the tra-
ditional legal position regarding euthanasia, through the examples of Germany 
and Portugal. Finally, we will see how other countries have innovated the legal 
solutions regarding euthanasia in several regions of the world, such as in con-
tinental Europe and in some countries with a common law system.  This analy-
sis will allow us to realise how the concepts and terminology so far explicated 
are used in actual regulation. Besides this, it will help us pointing out several 
unreasonable and incoherent aspects of this regulation and how these can be 
improved and overcome.  
IV. The Input from International Organisations 
Several international bodies have been alert to the intense and important debate 
over euthanasia. The debate is so relevant for the civil society that a large 
number of non-governmental organisations have intervened in the protection 
of their views. We can mention, e.g., the group of European non-governmental 
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organisations that has drafted the European Charter of Patients’ Rights.19 This 
document states that in no case patients can be left with no care at all (Article 
2). However, on the other hand, it also stipulates patients’ rights to consent and 
to free choice, as well as the right to avoid unnecessary suffering and pain (Ar-
ticles 4, 5 and 11). In any case, the most crucial decisions in this field at the in-
ternational level come from the Council of Europe and the European Union.  
A. The Council of Europe 
There is no international instrument stipulating any definitive solution for 
euthanasia. Still, there are some recommendations issued by international enti-
ties that should be taken into account. Amongst the most important, we should 
refer the ones drafted by the Council of Europe, valuing the role of the medical 
profession, opening space for ‘passive’ euthanasia and excluding the possibil-
ity of ‘active’ euthanasia. The Council of Europe has been clear on its mind 
about this issue20, when it recommended that  
“the Committee of Ministers encourage the member states of the Council of 
Europe to respect and protect the dignity of terminally ill or dying persons in 
all respects (…): 
c. by upholding the prohibition against intentionally taking the life of termi-
nally ill or dying persons, while: 
i. recognising that the right to life, especially with regard to a terminally ill 
or dying person, is guaranteed by the member states, in accordance with 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that 
"no one shall be deprived of his life intentionally"; 
ii. recognising that a terminally ill or dying person’s wish to die never con-
stitutes any legal claim to die at the hand of another person; 
iii. recognising that a terminally ill or dying person’s wish to die cannot of 
itself constitute a legal justification to carry out actions intended to bring 
about death.” 
Although this move consisted of a desperate call for the States not to legalise 
active euthanasia, the same document recognised that the respect and protec-
tion of the dignity of terminally ill or dying persons demanded protection of 
                                                 
19  <http://www.activecitizenship.net/projects/project_europe_chart.htm>.  
20  See Recommendation 1418 (1999) on the Protection of the human rights and dignity 
of the terminally ill and the dying, adopted by the Assembly of the COE on 25 June 
1999 (24th Sitting), <http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/ 
Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/EREC1418.htm> 
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their right to self-determination, through measures: 
“9. (…) b. (…) 
iii. to ensure that no terminally ill or dying person is treated against his or 
her will while ensuring that he/she is neither influenced nor pressured by 
another person. Furthermore, safeguards are to be envisaged to ensure that 
their wishes are not formed under economic pressure; 
iv. to ensure that a currently incapacitated terminally ill or dying person’s 
advance directive or living will refusing specific medical treatments is ob-
served. (…) 
v. to ensure that – notwithstanding the physician’s ultimate therapeutic re-
sponsibility – the expressed wishes of a terminally ill or dying person with 
regard to particular forms of treatment are taken into account, provided 
they do not violate human dignity; 
vi. to ensure that in situations where an advance directive or living will 
does not exist, the patient’s right to life is not infringed upon. A catalogue 
of treatments which under no condition may be withheld or withdrawn is 
to be defined”. 
This seems to indicate that some room should be given to the eventual practice 
of passive euthanasia. However, the exact sense of paragraph vi. creates some 
doubts by referring to a “catalogue of treatments which under no condition 
may be withheld or withdrawn”. It is not clear if this refers only to “situations 
where an advance directive or living will does not exist” or if this catalogue 
should include, e.g., life-sustaining mechanisms for unconscious patients with 
no perspectives of recovery. 
More recently, the Council of Europe has promoted, through its Steering 
Committee on Bioethics, a questionnaire to the Council’s member states con-
cerning “aspects of their law and practice relating to euthanasia and other end 
of life decisions”.21 The answers to this questionnaire constitute a very rich 
source of information. The two main conclusions we can take thereof are the 
following: 
– Euthanasia-related terminology is of common use in all member states of 
the Council of Europe (euthanasia, active euthanasia, passive euthanasia, 
assisted suicide), to the exception of assisted dying, at least as far as 
medical literature and other non-legal documents go (question 1). 
– In the great majority of state members it is legal to withdraw life sustain-
ing treatment from a patient who is considered as being brain dead (ques-
                                                 
21  COE, op. cit. 
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tions 17-18). 
Besides this, the case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has also provided many jurisdictions with milestone decisions. Pretty vs. 
United Kingdom, decided in 29 April 2002, was definitely one of the most im-
portant.22 This was the first time that the ECtHR pronounced itself on the 
question of knowing if the prohibition of assisted suicide violates the rights 
granted by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Mrs. Pretty, 
who was paralysed and suffered from a degenerative and incurable illness, 
wished her husband to help her commit suicide, since her neuro-degenerative 
illness could lead her to have an undignified end of life and she was not able to 
commit suicide by herself. According to the interpretation defended by her in 
Court, Article 2 ECHR, guaranteeing the right to life, also guaranteed the 
“right to choose to continue or stop living” and the “right to self-determination 
in relation to issues of life and death” (§ 4). Besides that, the British Authori-
ties would violate Article 3, which prohibits the infliction of inhuman or de-
grading treatment, if prosecuting her husband for having helped her to commit 
suicide. Furthermore, the refusal of the Director of Public Prosecutions to grant 
an immunity from prosecution to her husband and the prohibition in domestic 
law on assisting suicide infringed her right to respect for private and family life, 
her freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the prohibition of dis-
crimination (Articles 8, 9 and 14 ECHR). The Court dismissed the application 
by unanimity, refusing the interpretation Mrs. Pretty argued from both Articles 
2 and 3. Moreover, the Court stated that even though Article 8 grants the right 
to respect for the private life, state interferences thereto are licit in the name of 
protection of the right of others, given “the risk of abuses and the possible con-
sequences of abuses that may be committed which a relaxation of the general 
prohibition of assisted suicide or the creation of exceptions to the principle 
would entail” (§ 74). This argument of the Court corresponds to the slippery 
slope objection and, as already explained above, is hardly convincing: pessi-
mistic predictions can oppose any legal innovation and the merits of euthanasia 
itself are simply ignored. Still, even if the court refuses to identify a right to 
die, that does not mean that a state party to the convention may not, under cer-
tain conditions, allow death to be inflicted on a person upon his/her request, 
without violating its duty to protect the right to life.23 24 
                                                 
22  Pretty v. the United Kingdom (application no. 2346/02), European Court of Human 
Rights, 29 April 2002.  
23  European Union Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) 
– Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Mem-
bers States in 2002, p. 33, <http://www.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/cridho/CFR-CDF.Report2002. 
en.pdf>. 
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Anyhow, the approach taken by the ECtHR in several decisions leads us to 
believe that this Court will not, anytime in the near future, introduce any de-
velopments in the legal status of euthanasia in Europe. In fact, the ECtHR con-
siders, in regards to this as to other issues, that “the steps appropriate or neces-
sary to discharge a positive obligation will be more judgemental, more prone 
to variation from State to State, more dependent on the opinions and beliefs of 
the people and less susceptible to any universal injunction”.25 
B. The European Union 
The European Parliament (EP) has also decided to participate in the public de-
bate. Some members of the EP have expressed that the European Union mem-
ber countries should walk towards legalising euthanasia: 
“The European Parliament, (…) 28. Considers that the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as the protection of human dig-
nity, include the prohibition of over treatment, the promotion of palliative 
care, respect for the patient's wishes, as expressed through his or her will, for 
example; calls on the Member States to consider the possibility of amending 
laws on the end of life to this end by regulating euthanasia”.26 
However, in its formal declarations, the EP is considerably more cautious, stat-
ing the exact opposite ideas.27 
                                                                                                                                                      
24  See under comments regarding the Netherlands. 
25  § 15 Pretty v. the United Kingdom (application no. 2346/02), European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 29 April 2002, p. 10, in regards to Article 3. See also § 37 Rees v. United 
Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56, pp. 63-64, regarding Article 8. 
26  Draft European Parliament Resolution, in Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and 
Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (Rapporteur: Alima Boumediene-Thiery), Report on 
the situation as regards fundamental rights in the European Union (2003) (2003/ 
2006(INI)). In the same document, we can find another reference to euthanasia: “ma-
ny legal judgements support the death of disabled people, either through euthanasia 
laws or through regulations and judgements of quality of life leading to suspension of 
treatment”. See <http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT 
+REPORT+A5-2004-0207+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S& 
LSTDOC=Y>.  
27  See, e.g., “Respect for human rights in the European Union in 1995”, <http://www2. 
europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=108582> and “Report on Fundamental rights situation 
in the European Union for 2001”, <http://www2.europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=20477 
2>. 
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“‘Why don’t you want to let a dying man himself decide when he cannot take it 
anymore?’ I answered. ‘It is the least we can do!’”28 
in “Die Nacht von Lissabon” 
V. National Positions  
A. The Traditional Position 
Law in Germany or Portugal is as traditional and conservative in relation to 
this issue as most other countries’ regulation on euthanasia. The regulation in 
these countries can, therefore, be taken as good examples of how legislation 
traditionally deals with this problem, as for example in other countries with so 
different cultural and legal backgrounds and traditions such as Austria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy29, Ireland30 or Turkey.31 It is, however, 
                                                 
28  E. M. Remarque, “Die Nacht von Lissabon”, Droemer Knaur, München/Zürich 1962, 
p. 194. 
29  For more details on the Italian situation, and promoting a more reasonable and pro-
gressive legal development, see F. Giunta, “Diritto di morire e diritto penale”, in “Una 
norma giuridica per la bioetica”, a cura di Cosimo Marco Mazzoni, il Mulino, Bolo-
gna 1998, pp. 251-279. Already in the beginning of the 1970’s, some voices were 
heard for a more progressive position, e.g., F. Mantovani, “Problemi giuridici della 
eutanasia”, Archivio Giuridico “Filippo Serafini”, Vol. CLXXVIII, Fasc. 1-2, 
S.T.E.M.-Mucchi, Modena 1970, pp. 37-51 (however, the same author seems to have 
evolved much himself, since 18 years later he states a nearly more conservative opin-
ion on the same issue: F. Mantovani, “Aspecti giuridici della eutanasia”, Archivio Gi-
uridico “Filippo Serafini”, Vol. CCVIII, Fasc. 1-2, Mucchi Editore, Modena 1988, pp. 
67-95; Rivista Italiana di Diritto e Procedura Penale, XXXI, Fasc. 2, Aprile-Giugno, 
1988, Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, pp.448-469). 
30  Although the Irish legal rules regarding euthanasia can be inserted in the large group 
of countries that prohibit it, the Irish Supreme Court has offered a decision which 
shows signs of evolution: a forty-five years old woman, who had been in coma for 23 
years, was kept alive by a naso-gastric feeding tube. The court upheld the decision to 
cease treatment, following her parents petition, defending a large concept of the right 
to life (as including the right to die) (In re Ward of Court [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 401, cit. 
in E. Woods, “The right to die with dignity with the assistance of a physician: an An-
glo, American and Australian international perspective”, 4 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
817, Spring 1998). 
31  See W. Sohn and M. Zenz (eds.), “Euthanasia in Europe: national laws, medical 
guidelines, ethical aspects”, Schattauer, Stuttgart/New York 2002; Answer to question 
I.2, COE, op. cit. 
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interesting to note that, even countries where this kind of traditional legal 
frame exists, case-law developments are expected to ensure some evolution. 
This is the case, e.g., in Italy: Eluana Englaro has been in a vegetative state for 
13 years now, as a consequence of a car accident. Her father (and guardian) 
has requested the withdrawal of the feeding tube and forced hydration. Al-
though the Appeal Court of Milan has denied the request, arguing that feeding 
and hydration are not therapeutic treatments, it also recognised that he had the 
right to express consent or refuse therapeutic treatment to his daughter.32  
1. Germany33 
The word “euthanasia” remains until these days a complete taboo, since it is 
connected with the Nationalist-Socialist period atrocities. Instead, people 
rather use the word ‘Sterbehilfe’ (help to die).34 35 There is no specific legisla-
tion on euthanasia: the provisions contained in the Constitution and in the Pe-
nal Code regulate this issue. In fact, Article 1 (1) of the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz, GG) states that “Human dignity shall be inviolable”36, and, 
based on this provision, terminally ill patients are awarded the same protection 
than any other patient. Article 2 (1) GG protects the “right to free development 
of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend 
against constitutional order or the moral law” and (2) of the same provision 
awards every person “the right to life and physical integrity”. Still, this does 
not mean that one has the right to dispose from his/her own life, because these 
provisions enforce protection of the right to life from third parties’ aggressions. 
As for the Penal law, Article 216 (1) of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, 
StGB) establishes that “If someone is induced to homicide by the express and 
                                                 
32  Reported in “La Reppublica”, 22 March 2005, p. 16. The Appeal to the Supreme 
Court (Cassazione) was also refused: “Cassazione, respinto il ricorso del padre Eluana 
Englaro continuerà a vivere”, <http://www.repubblica.it/2005/c/sezioni/cronaca/ 
eutanasia/deciscassaz/deciscassaz.html>.  
33  In general, see Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de 
législation comparée No 49”, January 1999, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49_mono. 
html>, and German answer to question II.2 of COE>, “Replies to the questionnaire for 
member states relating to euthanasia”, op. cit. 
34  See, as a clear example of how some German authors have severe difficulties to sepa-
rate eugenic nazi euthanasia practices from nowadays debate, W. Creutzfeldt, “Eutha-
nasie: geistige Wurzeln im 19., Verbrechen im 20., Legalisierung im 21. Jahrhun-
dert?”, Medizinische Klinik 2000; 95:714-719 (Nr. 12). 
35  All translations of legal rules and scholarly writings, originally in a language other 
than English, quoted in this work have been translated by us, unless otherwise stated. 
36  Translation taken from <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/index.html>. 
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earnest request of the person killed, then imprisonment from six months to five 
years shall be imposed“.37 This corresponds to a lighter sanction than the one 
applicable in case of murder (life imprisonment), manslaughter (minimum five 
years imprisonment) or less serious case of manslaughter (one to ten years im-
prisonment), foreseen in Articles 211-213 StGB. Besides that, assisted suicide 
is punishable as far as it may constitute a case of failure to render assistance, as 
foreseen in Article 323 (c) StGB. According to this rule, “Whoever does not 
render assistance during accidents or common danger or need, although it is 
required and can be expected of him under the circumstances and, especially, 
is possible without substantial danger to himself and without violation of other 
important duties, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than one 
year or a fine.” The reasoning of the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht-
shof, BGH) is the following: suicide is not punishable, and the person who 
merely assists to suicide does not take an active role in the suicide itself, there-
fore, he/she cannot be considered the author of such conduct. The court also 
considers suicide as an accident (one wonders how exactly can that be), so the 
person who assists to it will be punished (and only in that case) if the one who 
commits suicide loses conscience. In this case, Article 323 (c) StGB imposes a 
duty to render assistance. This means that assisting to suicide is not punishable, 
but not rendering assistance when it has been already attempted is. The inco-
herent and outrageous consequences of this reasoning are quite clear: if the as-
sistance to suicide has as effect of producing an immediate death, without a pe-
riod of unconsciousness (e.g., providing a gun, which is used for a shot in the 
head), there is no opportunity for rendering assistance to save the person who 
wants to die, so there is no punishable conduct. However, if the assistance 
leads to a slow death, with a period of unconsciousness (e.g., providing lethal 
pills with a slow effect), then there is the duty to assist in saving the person 
who wants to die. This remains true even knowing that committing suicide 
with a gun can be more painful and traumatising for everyone involved than 
doing it with lethal pills.  
Case law has been in general more lenient with cases of assisted suicide 
when the patient is physically capable of committing the final act. On the other 
side, courts are very demanding in regards to cases where the patient has such 
grave disabilities that he/she would have difficulties carrying out the suicide 
him/herself. This distinction obviously sanctions patients who are already in a 
worst condition due to their disabilities. It means that if you can carry out the 
suicide yourself, you can even receive assistance in your act (and no one will 
be punished as long as the death is fast and there is no opportunity for assis-
                                                 
37  Ibidem. 
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tance to save from it). However, if you are so severely handicapped that you 
cannot carry the act yourself, than you cannot receive any assistance, otherwise 
the person providing such assistance will be very likely punished for homicide 
by request (Article 216 (1) StGB). The results produced by the existing provi-
sions and case law are, in conclusion, unsatisfactory and unfair.38 
As for the case of indirect euthanasia, German courts have stated that pre-
scribing pain killing medication according to the expressed or presumed will of 
the patient is acceptable even if it unintentionally leads to the acceleration of 
death as an unavoidable side-effect.39 Both scholars and courts are generally in 
favour of a painless, albeit faster, death, in respect of the patient’s will, than 
prolonging the patient’s life to the cost of great pain.  
With regard to passive euthanasia, the interruption of life-prolonging medi-
cal treatment is considered licit when the patient so requests, the pain is much 
and inevitable and death is predicted to happen soon. The self-determination 
right, protected by Article 2 (1) GG, allows, therefore, for refusing intensive 
care and treatment of further medical difficulties. This is also valid for patients 
who are incompetent to give their consent, in which case physicians base their 
decision on the patient’s living will or presumed will, taking into account pre-
vious oral or written statements or religious or philosophical convictions. §§ 
1896-1908 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) also 
foresee the possibility for incompetent patients to designate a guardian, who is 
entitled to take decisions regarding medical care. § 1904 specifies the case of 
medical decisions that may cause the death or severe physical injury of the in-
competent patient: in this case, the guardianship court has to confirm the deci-
sion of the guardian. The BGH defined its stand on these issues in 1993.40 On 
one hand, the BGH stated the necessity of hearing the guardianship court when 
ceasing life-sustaining treatments, on the other hand, it determined the legal 
binding effect of living wills. More precisely, the court has found that, when a 
patient is not competent, life-sustaining measures must cease when the pa-
tient’s will, in the form of something like a living will, so determines. This is a 
consequence of the concept of human dignity and right to self-determination. 
                                                 
38  For a better understanding and deeper analysis of German case law and distinction 
performed by the courts between active, passive and indirect euthanasia, and assisted 
suicide, see K. Becker-Schwarze, “Möglichkeiten der rechtlichen Regulierung einer 
selbstbetimmten Entscheidung am Lebensende”, in Gert Brüggemeier (Hrsg), “Liber 
Amicorum, Eike Schmidt zum 65. Geburtstag am 26.11.2004”, C.F.Müller Verlag, 
Heidelberg 2005, pp. 1-31. 
39  BGHSt 42, 301, from 15 November 1996 - Indirekte Sterbehilfe, <http://www.oefre. 
unibe.ch/law/dfr/bs042301.html>. 
40  BGH, Beschluß v. 17.3.2003 – XII ZB 2/03 (OLG Schleswig). 
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The court only has to determine the presumed will of the patient (based on 
his/her life decisions, values and convictions), when the patient has not previ-
ously expressed his/her will. The patient’s guardian should express and concre-
tise the will of the patient. However, when such will pertains life sustaining 
and prolonging treatments, it has to be confirmed by the guardianship court. 
Voices against this decision arouse immediately, though, pointing out the 
negative effect that such conclusions might have on legal certainty.41 
Some authors go even further and argue that decisions regarding the inter-
ruption of medical treatment should be excluded from the powers awarded to 
guardians. Nonetheless, the possibility for passive euthanasia, be it for compe-
tent or incompetent patients, does not generally allow for refusing general care 
such as artificial feeding and hydration. The Federal Supreme Court opened 
one exception in 199442, when it accepted the request of the son of a woman in 
coma for several years to cease her mother’s artificial feeding. The court based 
this exception in the presumed will of the patient, and a similar decision was 
taken by the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt in 1998.43 Both these decisions 
raised some controversy, since the death was not predicted to take place in a 
short period of time. On the contrary, ceasing artificial breathing is generally 
accepted, because it is considered interrupting a treatment. Should the ceasing 
of artificial breathing and feeding not have the same legal standing? Why is 
one controversial and the other is not? There does not seem to be any substan-
tial difference between one and the other: both are life-sustaining treatments 
and removing any of them has the effect of causing death.  
Finally, although without any binding value, the directives emanated by the 
Federal Chamber of Physicians have provided some guidelines regarding the 
treatment of terminally ill patients and euthanasia.44 These guide-lines were 
released in 1979 for the first time and were later on revised, in 1993, 1998 and 
in 2004, after debates over these issues and other developments have taken 
place. Although the last version of this document still proclaims the duty to 
maintain life as the main medical duty of physicians, it also recognises that 
therapy can be replaced with palliative care under certain circumstances. In 
any case, even if the right to self-determination is said to be relevant in all 
cases, the possibility of practicing active euthanasia is completely set aside. 
                                                 
41  Spickhoff, Comment on decision of BGH from 17.3.2003, in JZ 2003, 739-741. 
42  BGH, 1. Strafsenat v. 13.09.94; BGHSt 40, 257-272. 
43  OLG Frankfurt a. M., Beschluß v. 15.07.1998 – 20 W 224/98; NJW 1998, 2747 ff. 
See also, more recently, OLG Karlsruhe, Beschluß v. 26.3.2004 – 11 Wx 13/04; NJW 
2004, 1882-1883. 
44  “Grundsätze der Bundesärztekammer zur ärztlichen Sterbebegleitung”, <http://www. 
bundesaerztekammer.de/30/Richtlinien/Empfidx/Sterbebegl2004.pdf>. 
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The latest guidelines of the Federal Chamber of Physicians place the pa-
tients’ self-determination right at the top of the medical care priorities.45 Still, 
the opinions amongst politicians are much divided, even within the same po-
litical groups, as the opposite declarations from the health and justice ministers 
concerning the already mentioned decision from the Oberlandesgericht Frank-
furt demonstrate. More recently, a working group has been in charge of dis-
cussing if it would be advisable to introduce amendments to the law to better 
protect dying patients’ autonomy (BMJ-Arbeitsgruppe “Patientenautonomie 
am Lebensende”). It was expressly out of the scope of this group’s work con-
sidering the legalisation of active euthanasia. Still, the opinions expressed in 
the final report46 of the working group created enough controversy to provoke 
reactions, such as that from the Enquete-Kommission of the German Parlia-
ment “Ethik und Recht der modernen Medizin”.47 The discussion focuses now 
on how to protect patients’ right to self-determination in practice. This reveals 
some progression in the German debate, which will, hopefully, eventually lead 
to more coherent and suitable rules and decisions.  
2. Portugal48 
We can distinguish the contributions of different legal levels to the debate on 
euthanasia. As far as the constitutional rules go, Article 24 of the Constitu-
tion49, which protects the right to life, states: “1) Human life is inviolable” and 
“2) In no case shall the death penalty be applied”. As already previously dis-
cussed, the definition of the right to life raises several fundamental questions, 
namely, if there is a right for each person to organise his/her own death. In 
what specifically concerns euthanasia, the majority of the Portuguese authors 
considers that there is no juridical-constitutional right to ‘active’ euthanasia. 
Therefore, there is no right to ask a third person to provoke his/her death in or-
                                                 
45  Ibidem, and “Charta der Patientenrechte” (Draft), from 27 October 1999, 
<http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/30/Richtlinien/Empfidx/Patientenrechte.html>. 
46  “Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe ‚Patientenautonomie am Lebensende’ vom 10. Juni 2004”, 
<http://www.bmj.bund.de>. 
47  For more details on the present debates, see K. Becker-Schwarze, op. cit., p. 2. 
48  J. J. Canotilho, V. Moreira; “Constituicão da República Portuguesa, Anotada”, Coim-
bra, Coimbra Editora, 1993; Conselho Nacional de Ética para as Ciências da Vida, 
“Aspectos éticos dos cuidados de saúde relacionados com o final da vida”, Lisboa, 
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros; J. F. Dias et. al., “Comentário Conimbricense 
do Código Penal”, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 1999. 
49  Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, from 2 April 1976, Text according to the 
Fourth revision introduced by the Constitutional Law no. 1/97 of 20 September, 
<http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html>. 
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der to finish the pain and allow for a ‘sweet death’, since respect for others’ 
lives cannot exempt mercy-killers. As far as ‘passive’ euthanasia is concerned 
(defined as the right to oppose artificially sustained life in case of incurable 
disease), it is agreed that the Constitution allows for special rules to be applied 
to terminally ill patients, in order to ensure their right to death with dignity. 
However, this possibility would not even allow for clearly stopping ‘treatment’ 
(palliative care or caring medicine). 
The essential rules of the Penal Code attaining the problem in question are 
Articles 13450 and 13551. Article 134 (homicide at request of the victim) corre-
sponds to a suicide for the victim and a killing for the agent; therefore, the Por-
tuguese Penal Code opted for considering this conduct a privileged form of the 
fundamental form of the crime of homicide (as it also happens in Austria, 
Switzerland or Germany). It is the “serious, insistent and expressed request” 
from the victim that legitimises the reduction of both the wrongfulness and the 
guilt: the request expresses the victim’s autonomy and self-determination as 
well as his/her renouncement to the penal protection of the juridical value, this 
way reducing the wrongfulness of the agent’s conduct. In any case, this makes 
the so-called ‘active’ euthanasia forbidden. However, for many authors, firstly, 
a juridical value should be conceived as merely subjective and relational and, 
secondly, lesions caused to someone else by request and self-lesions should be 
valued as normatively equivalent. Still, the majority agrees with the political-
criminal legitimacy of this legal provision. Consent does not make any differ-
ence, since penal protection is given to the patient’s life, no matter if he/she 
wants it or not. 
A crucial moment in defining this crime is deciding if it can only occur by 
action or also by omission. Much case law and some authors have argued that it 
is also possible to commit this crime by omission. However, the majority of the 
authors clearly deny this possibility. The victim’s request does not give the right 
to kill, but it does not create the duty to save either – it would be the patient’s 
opposition to the help that would eliminate the doctor’s or anyone else’s duty to 
save him/her. According to Portuguese lawyers’ opinion, this makes the so-
                                                 
50  Article 134: “(Homicide at request of the victim) 1. Who kills another person deter-
mined by expressed, insistent and serious request that has been addressed to him is 
punished with prison for a maximum of 3 years. 2. Attempt is punishable.” 
51  Article 135: “(Instigation or help at suicide) 1. Who instigates another person to com-
mit suicide, or gives that person help for that aim, is punished with prison for a maxi-
mum of 3 years, if suicide is effectively attempted or consummated. 2. If the insti-
gated person or the one to whom help is being given is a minor of under 16 years old 
or has, for any reason, his capacity of valuation or determination sensitively dimin-
ished, the agent is punished with prison from 1 to 5 years.” 
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called ‘passive’ euthanasia legal according to the Portuguese legal system (such 
as turning off the life-supporting system), at least if administered by a doctor. 
Nevertheless, this opinion is hardly reconcilable with three other facts: 
a) The Portuguese Penal Code also states that any crime can, in principle, be 
committed by omission (Article 10), and there is no definite reason to 
deny this possibility in the case of homicide at request of the victim. 
b) The crime of help at suicide or even the crime of omission of the duty of 
help (Article 200), as determined by the Portuguese Penal Code, would 
most likely include many of the conducts not punished by this article. 
c) This position fails any test of coherence, as it also happens to the distinc-
tion between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ euthanasia.  
As for Article 135 (instigation or help at suicide), it is conceived as an inde-
pendent type of crime, not a special kind of homicide. Only a few countries 
have this crime in an independent rule (Austria, Switzerland, Greece, Spain, 
France), but, in reality, countries which do not even have an identical article 
punish the same conduct (sometimes even more than countries that expressly 
foresee that crime) through other provisions (homicide by omission at request 
of the victim or omission of the duty of help). We should start by distinguish-
ing this provision from Article 134: homicide at request of the victim starts and 
instigation or help at suicide ends when the agent’s cooperation in someone’s 
death is not just mere help and becomes a typified conduct of the agent. This 
distinction is essential for basically two reasons: Some legal systems (like, as 
we have seen above, the German one) only punish homicide at request of the 
victim and not help at suicide and the systems that punish both have different 
rules for each one (in the Portuguese case, although both conducts are pun-
ished with the same number of years of prison, attempt is only punishable in 
the case of homicide by request of the victim). Of course that applying this dis-
tinction in concrete cases is extremely complex and many theories fail in giv-
ing a satisfactory answer. Still, one of the probably most capable one uses the 
criteria of the dominion over the act that directly and irreversibly produces 
death. Also in what concerns this provision, authors try to make it possible for 
‘passive’ euthanasia to be legal, saying that it is not suicide (at least for what 
this article is concerned), for example, refusing treatment, even if it is a life-
saving treatment. However, would it not be more reasonable to base this solu-
tion in the patient’s autonomy or self-determination right? Is it not a twisted 
game playing with reality this way? It would definitely be more conceivable 
accepting euthanasia rather than forbidding it and then allowing a limited 
number of cases through distorting the law. 
Still at the penal law level, we should refer Article 156, which prohibits 
compulsory treatments or surgical intervention: doctors who maintain life-
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saving treatment for patients who have expressly denied it are criminally re-
sponsible. The self-determination right, stated in Article 70 of the Civil Code, 
also supports this solution. Once again, we can see a breach for ‘passive’ eutha-
nasia, but patients in a vegetative state could benefit from this rule, since they 
cannot refuse treatment. Euthanasia remains without a proper and adequate solu-
tion; Portuguese law still denies too many people a dignified death and refuses 
to offer a coherent and valid set of useful and reasonable rules. As a Portuguese 
scholar puts it, “it is important to reflect upon the ethical fairness of that [the 
Portuguese] solution in cases where the patient, by him/herself, cannot put an 
end to his/her life and, consequently, is in disadvantage in comparison to all 
other human beings – beings who can freely choose their own death. This is the 
perspective that should be adopted as a starting point of a discussion that has 
been repeatedly obstructed by an obsessed affirmation of principles, which sub-
jugates to its ideological weight the most respect worthy human needs”.52 
On a report from the National Ethics Council for the Sciences of Life, all 
prejudices and mistakes of the law were reproduced.53 The main point was re-
inforcing caring medicine as the only solution for people in a morbid state (al-
though it definitely is not, as already previously discussed). Caring medicine, 
besides all its scientific limitations, does not solve any of the problems related 
to patients in vegetative states nor does it save terminally ill incurable patients 
from extreme psychological and physical pain. This report also re-affirmed the 
ethical validity of the Penal Code rules and, when accepting the validity of liv-
ing wills that ask for the suspension of therapeutic measures whose only effect 
is a prolongation of the process of death, it refuses to call it euthanasia. 
Finally, the Deontological Code of the Medical Doctors Association54, in 
its Article 50, allows for retrieving “extraordinary means of life-support” in 
cases of irreversible coma, as well as for the possibility of not enforcing treat-
ment on terminally ill patients. Here we see again the preference for letting pa-
tients die slowly and left to their pain rather than helping them die in a faster 
but comforting way. And once again pointless and euphemistic distinctions are 
used (such as ordinary/extraordinary means) in order to differentiate allowed 
and not allowed conduct, even if at the end they all lead to the same thing: let-
                                                 
52  R. Pereira, “Eutanásia e tratamentos médicos”, Expresso, 6 April 2002, p. 24. 
53  “Parecer sobre aspectos éticos dos cuidados de saúde relacionados com o final da vida 
(11/CNECV/95)”, <http://www.cnecv.gov.pt/NR/rdonlyres/73BC59DC-729C-48A2-8 
149-9126D7CDF3EE/0/P011FinalDaVida.pdf>. 
54  Although this document does not have the legal status of law, it is legally relevant at the 
level of disciplinary responsibility and as an indirect source of rights, in particular in 
what regards civil responsibility: F. Dias, S. Monteiro, “Portugal”, in E. Deutsch/ H.L. 
Schreiber (eds.), Medical Responsibility in Western Europe, Springer-Verlag, p. 522. 
  27
ting someone die when his/her life is not willingly lived anymore. 
B. Other Continental European Solutions 
1. Belgium 
Both withholding and withdrawing life-saving treatment have long been gen-
erally accepted in Belgium. Moreover, popular support for euthanasia reached 
72% of the population in 2001.55 In that same year, a proposal of law on 
euthanasia was adopted by the Senate and, afterwards, by the House of Repre-
sentatives. This legal act can be put into a very specific political context: the 
‘rainbow’ coalition, which included the liberal, socialist and green parties and 
arrived to power in 1999, opened the way to a series of themes that were con-
sidered taboo until then, such as legalising cannabis consumption, homosexual 
marriage and euthanasia.56 The process of legalisation of euthanasia took three 
years in total and was considered to produce a stricter regime than the Dutch 
one.57 
The act legalising euthanasia, Act of 28 May 2002 on euthanasia, effective 
on 20 September 2002, established the following requirements (Article 3):58 
– of age or emancipated minor patient, but never younger than fifteen years 
old;  
– constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alle-
viated; 
– result from an accidental or pathological disorder; 
– serious and incurable condition; 
– physician’s verification of capacity to express request, age and con-
sciousness of patient; 
– request has to be voluntary, repeated and carefully considered, as well as 
not result from outside pressure; 
– request has to be written, dated and signed, can be made at the moment 
itself or beforehand (validity limited to 5 years) and may be revoked or 
                                                 
55  Público, 15 May 2002, p. 22. 
56  Daniel do Rosário, “Eutanásia vai ser legalizada”, Expresso, 12 May 2001.  
57  Ibidem; “Bélgica discute lei da eutanásia”, Expresso, 16 May 2002. 
58  Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Belge, 22 June 2002, pp. 28515-28520, <http://www. 
juridat.be/cgi_tit/titf.pl>. 
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changed at any time; 
– interview where the physician, namely, informs the patient of therapeutic 
options which may still be available, as well as several periodical inter-
views to ensure that the patient is in fact persistently physically or psychi-
cally suffering and reiterates his/her request. 
Besides these, the law also requires consultation of:59 
– another physician, independent and expert of the relevant pathology, who 
has to submit a report confirming the health condition of the patient; 
– the team of medical care professionals who take care of the patient; 
– the people close to the patient that he/she designated, in case he/she so 
wishes. 
In case the patient is not terminally ill, the physician has to consult a second 
independent expert physician. This physician has to submit a similar report to 
the one from the first independent physician and a period of at least one month 
between the request for euthanasia and the act has to be respected. In case the 
patient is unconscious and has not produced a living will, the patient’s proxy 
may also request the ceasing of medical treatment if he/she can prove that 
his/her request derives from the patient’s expressed will.60 
There is a federal Commission in charge of controlling and evaluating the 
application of the law61: all files of patients who have received euthanasia, 
specifying the conditions of the act and the procedure that was followed, are 
sent to this Commission. It then verifies if the rules were respected. If it was 
not the case, the Commission passes the file on to prosecuting authorities and 
the case will be handled according to the general terms of criminal law. Ac-
cording to this, the responsible medical care professional can be charged with 
voluntary homicide, premeditated homicide and/or poisoning (Articles 393, 
394 and 397 Penal Code), or, if it is a case of assisted suicide, with non assis-
tance to person in danger (Articles 422 bis and 422 ter Penal Code).62 This 
Commission is also in charge of submitting to the legislative Chambers reports 
describing and evaluating the application of this law, as well as providing rec-
                                                 
59  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 109”, July 2002, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.pdf>, p. 8. 
60  Service des études juridiques du Sénat, “Étude de législation comparée n° 139, no-
vembre 2004 – Les droits du malade en fin de vie”, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc139/ 
lc139.pdf>, pp. 21-22. 
61  See answer to question I.2 and II.12 of COE, op. cit. 
62  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie- Étude de législation com-
parée nº 109”, July 2002, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.pdf>, p. 7. 
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ommendations for changes or additions to the law when necessary. 
It is important to mention that, according to the Act of 14 June 2002 on pal-
liative care63, public authorities have the obligation to guarantee equal access 
to palliative care for incurable patients, both in what regards its provision and 
reimbursement. This way, it is clearly avoided that disadvantaged, isolated or 
vulnerable patients request suicide for financial reasons, i.e., for not being able 
to afford good palliative care.  
2. Denmark64 
Active euthanasia remains forbidden in Denmark. It can be punished through 
Articles 239 (homicide upon request of the victim) and 240 (help to commit 
suicide) of the Danish Penal Code. The penalties for these crimes are lighter 
than those applied to homicide, and can even be further attenuated or sup-
pressed if those acts were committed under specific circumstances (Articles 84 
and 85 Penal Code).  
On the other hand, the practice of passive and indirect euthanasia has been 
officially recognised and regulated in Denmark. In fact, the Medical Profession 
Exercise Act 1992 recognises the right to any person of age who has the capac-
ity thereto to express in advance his/her refusal to treatment, if he/she would 
find him/herself in a situation in which he/she would not be able to express 
his/her will (Article 6 (a)). Even when there is no such living will, physicians 
may withhold or withdraw medical treatment if the patient is dying or will in-
evitably die and the treatment would merely delay death (Article 6 (5)). Indi-
rect euthanasia is allowed by Article 6 (5) of the same Act, which says that, if 
the patient is dying or will inevitably die, physicians may prescribe analgesics, 
sedatives or similar drugs when necessary to calm the patient, even if that ac-
tion may lead to hasten the moment of death. 
In addition, the Patient Status Act 1998 reinforced the protection to the right 
to self-determination of patients, in the same terms as the already mentioned 
Medical Profession Exercise Act 1992, i.e., recognising the binding value of liv-
ing wills and allowing for passive and indirect euthanasia (Articles 16 and 17). 
Besides that, it stated the exact contents the living wills could have and the rules 
                                                 
63  Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Belge, 14 June 2002, pp. 49160-49161, <http://www. 
juridat.be/cgi_tit/titf.pl>. 
64  See, in general, Danish answer to question II.5 of COE, op. cit., and Service des Affai-
res Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation comparée nº 49”, Ja-
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regarding their use.65 Finally, it made clear that, although living wills have a 
binding value in case of terminally ill patients, they only possess a mere indica-
tive value in case of serious or disabling disease (Article 17, (2) and (5)). 
Denmark offers us a particularly interesting example of how the borders be-
tween (supposedly) different concepts can, at the end, be extremely feeble. In-
direct euthanasia is legally and medically accepted, as in many other countries, 
like the ones possessing the typical legal framework presented above for Ger-
many and Portugal. However, a report of the Ethics Committee from 199666 
showed that one in ten physicians exaggeratedly resorted to the prescription of 
morphine to shorten the life of dying patients. A practice consensually consid-
ered to be in accordance to medical ethics is only a step away from active 
euthanasia, which, again, leads us to doubt the correctness of the traditional 
categories of active, passive and indirect euthanasia. 
3. France 
The debate over euthanasia has come about regularly in the French society dur-
ing the last two decades. The common practice in certain hospitals of adminis-
tering lethal cocktails was very much publicized during the 1980’s. These le-
thal cocktails consisted of a mixture of drugs given in such quantities that lead 
the patient to a state of unconsciousness and accelerated the process of dying. 
Such mixtures are, according to the belief of a large group of professionals and 
public opinion, used constantly, even systematically, in certain hospital ser-
vices, having become the regular “medication” in the last days before death. 
This even happens when the patient does not request it, or when he/she is not 
suffering from severe pain. This is the case, even though the Medical Deonto-
logical Code of 1995 states that the ”physician must accompany the dying per-
son until his/her last moments, ensure through appropriate health care and ap-
propriate measures the quality of a life which is ending, protect the dignity of 
the patient and comfort his/her close contact. The physician does not have the 
right to provoke deliberately a death” (Article 38).67  
The National Advisory Ethics Committee for Life Sciences and Health68 de-
livered an opinion in January 2000 entitled “End of life, ending of life, euthana-
                                                 
65  These were further detailed by the Regulation of the Ministry of Health of 14 September 
1998.  
66  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 49”, January 1999, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49_mono.html>. 
67  Code de déontologie de l’Ordre National de Médecins, <http://www.conseil-national. 
medecin.fr/?url=deonto/rubrique.php>. 
68  Comité consultatif national d’éthique pour les sciences de la vie et de la santé (CCNE). 
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sia”.69 It explicitly proposed more flexibility towards the possibility of practic-
ing euthanasia, evoking the possibility of a “euthanasia exception” enabling a 
response, without incurring a criminal sanction, to a specific request from a suf-
fering patient who is dying.70 The “principle of refusal of therapeutic relentless-
ness” was by then a central piece of the debate and became the cornerstone of 
the law guaranteeing access to palliative care. The level of people who some 
way or the other supported the practice of euthanasia reached 84% in 2001.71 
The Law of 4 March 200272, regulating the rights of patients and the quality 
of the health care system, empowered the protection of the right to dignity of 
the sick person. The debate taking place since 1995 was, in fact, able to pro-
duce a movement towards greater respect for the patient’s freedom and right to 
refuse treatment.73 
During the year of 2004, the French Senate analysed two law proposals re-
garding the issue of euthanasia, perhaps impelled by the previous Dutch and 
Belgian legal evolution. One of these proposals regarded the right to benefit 
from euthanasia, and the other one the autonomy of person, living wills, medi-
cal assistance to suicide and voluntary euthanasia. A third law proposal, re-
ferred rather euphemistically to “the rights of patients and to the end-of-life”, 
ended up conquering more supporters.74 The report prepared by a special 
commission of the French Assemblée Nationale75 on this law proposal found 
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70  See answer to question II.13 of COE, op. cit. 
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303, 4 March 2002, published in the French Republic Official Journal n. 54, on 5 
March 2002, pp. 4118 ff., <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>. 
73  See answer to question I.2 of COE, op. cit. 
74  This law also found support in the practices of other European countries. In fact, in 
November 2004, the Service des études juridiques du Sénat (Legal Studies Service of 
the Senate) prepared a comparative study on the rights of patients at the end-of-life. It 
concluded that in all countries that were analysed (Germany, England, Wales, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Spain and Switzerland): 
- the refusal of treatment was admitted, even if it risked leading to death (although in 
Germany, Denmark and Switzerland this right applies essentially to patients at the 
end-of-life); 
- living wills are recognised (although, again in Germany, Denmark and Switzerland, 
its application is dependable on the health condition of the patient); and, 
- the request for ceasing medical treatment from the proxy of an unconscious patient is 
generally submitted to several conditions. See <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc139/lc139.pdf>. 
75  “Rapport fait au nom de la Commission Spéciale chargée d’examiner la proposition de 
loi (n° 1882) de M. Jean Leonetti et plusieurs de ses collègues relative aux droits des 
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that, when trying to give an answer to the philosophical, religious, ethical, ju-
ridical, social and medical issues at stake, the legislator did not have to either 
maintain the status quo nor legalise euthanasia. The legislator had, as a middle 
way, the possibility of improving and modernising the status quo, without 
completely legalising euthanasia. This option would take into account the 
common practice in hospitals, which included, e.g., the actual turning off of 
between 75.000 and 100.000 reanimation machines, and the patients’ desire for 
more legal certainty. This legal proposal was approved in November 200476 
and recognises the right to refuse treatment that is necessary to survival, i.e., to 
passive euthanasia, even in the case of patients who are not at the end of life 
(Articles 1 and 6). Besides this, it established that the decision regarding ceas-
ing treatment of an unconscious patient had to be taken through a collegial 
procedure; in other words, passive euthanasia is also foreseen for unconscious 
patients (Articles 5 and 9). Furthermore, indirect euthanasia is also accepted, as 
long as the patient is aware of it (Article 2). Finally, the legal value of living 
wills is recognised (Article 7). As the rapporteur of the report on this law, Mr. 
Jean Leonetti, precised, this law places again the most fundamental human 
values in the centre of the debate, namely the right to freedom and human life 
autonomy, as well as respect for the person. 
However positive this evolution may be, the “Loi Léonetti” is still consid-
ered by many as a repressive legal solution, as far as assisted suicide remains 
completely excluded. A movement for liberalisation of euthanasia in France 
calls for a “Loi Vincent Humbert”.77 Vincent Humbert, at the time with con-
science and paraplegic as a consequence of a car accident, died in September 
2003 after he repeatedly requested his mother and a physician to help him 
die.78 The exact circumstances – administration of a lethal drug or mere refusal 
of treatment or withholding of reanimation – are still to be determined by the 
court, and the mother and the physician face a 5 and 20 years imprisonment 
sentence respectively. This case, which resonated profoundly in the media, 
would not find a satisfactory solution in the Loi Léonetti. Therefore, the 
movement pro-liberalisation of euthanasia found a good source of motivation 
and inspiration in it to show it disproval towards the Loi Léonetti and continue 
calling for a more progressive law.  
                                                                                                                                                      
malades et à la fin de vie”, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rapports/r1929.asp>.  
76  Loi n° 2005-370 du 22 Avril 2005 parue au JO n° 95 du 23 avril 2005, <http://www. 
senat.fr/dossierleg/ppl04-090.html>.  
77  <http://www.fautquonsactive.com>.  
78  “Sans toi ni loi”, <http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?Article=257255&AG>.  
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4. Spain79 
Spain offered us a striking and poignant case that inspired the already mentioned 
film “Mar adentro”. Ramón Sampedro, a quadriplegic Galician who spent the 
last 29 years of his life lying in bed, committed suicide with the assistance of 
eleven friends in 2002. His five year long legal battle for a ‘dignified death’ did 
not lead to any satisfactory conclusion. Albeit the arguments invoked (the rights 
to dignity, free development of one’s personality, to life, to physical and psycho-
logical integrity and to a fair trial), no judge was convinced of his ultimate 
motto: “living is a right, not an obligation”. He finally succeeded in his aim, 
through the assistance of a group of friends, one of which was taken to court in 
2005: the prosecution right fell due to statute of limitations and the claim was 
archived.80 The well-succeeded assisted suicide drew much attention from the 
media and gave a new impetus to the campaign for decriminalisation of eutha-
nasia, both in Spain and in many other countries.81 
The Sampedro case gave grounds for international case law as well. His 
heir, Manuela Sanlés Sanlés, proceeded with Sampedro’s legal claims and 
eventually appealed to the ECtHR. She argued the violation by the Spanish 
state of the right to a life of dignity and a dignified death in respect of Ramón 
Sampedro, the right to non-interference by the state in the exercise of his free-
dom and his right to equal treatment. The claim was considered inadmissible 
ratione personae, since an heir was not entitled to pursue such proceedings. 
The case then reached the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations.82 
The heir claimed the violation of Sampedro’s rights not to be subjected to in-
human or degrading treatment, to life, to freedom of thought and conscience 
and to manifest his personal beliefs through practices or deeds, to liberty and to 
equal protection of the law (Articles 7, 6, 18, 9, 2, 26 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights83). The Spanish State defended, among other 
things, that this claim was in practice the exercise of a actio popularis, since it 
was legally and scientifically impossible to recognise a dead person’s right to 
                                                 
79  For an overview of legislative and social aspects of the euthanasia debate in Spain, see 
M. Casado Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 29-56. 
80  “Ramona Maneiro no tendrá que sentarse en el banquillo”, <http://www.20minutos.es/ 
noticia/11693/0/ramona/maneiro/absuelta/>. 
81  “O inferno de Sampedro”, José Alves, Vidas/Expresso, 4 January 2003, p. 34. 
82  Communication no. 1024/2001, Sanles Sanles v. Spain, (Decision adopted on 30 March 
2004, eightieth session), in Report of the Human Rights Committee (Volume II), Sev-
enty-ninth session (20 October-7 November 2003), Eightieth session (15 March - 2 
April 2004), Eighty-first session (5-30 July 2004): <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc. 
nsf/0/f0c6766939e65645c1256ffd0024998f/$FILE/G0443700.pdf>, pp. 505-511. 
83  Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
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die. The communication was, at the end, considered inadmissible in reason of 
Sampedro having committed suicide and the authorities not having pursued 
proceedings against those involved. 
The Spanish Penal Code 1995 reform had already softened the sanctions 
applied in cases of euthanasia (from 6 months to 6 years imprisonment).84 Af-
ter the Sampedro case, reactions from politicians, intellectuals and even mem-
bers of religious groups became more open to this issue and supported a fur-
ther development of the legislation. Besides this, the law regarding the rights 
of the patient foresees the legal value of living wills and the application of the 
right to refuse treatment to any patient or treatment, even when leading to 
death, i.e., passive euthanasia is in practice legal.85 In case the patient is un-
conscious or incompetent and has not produced a living will, the patient’s 
proxy may, according to the patient’s own presumed will and scale of values, 
accept or refuse medical treatment. In these cases, the deontological rules as-
sume a particular value: therapeutic relentlessness should be avoided and indi-
rect euthanasia is acceptable.86 
More recently, a medical scandal raised awareness about the problem of ex-
cessive sedation, i.e., indirect euthanasia, in Spain. A series of anonymous de-
nouncements alerted the sanitary inspection authorities to about 400 cases of 
excessive sedation in a particular hospital in the region of Madrid.87 All physi-
cians who integrated the internal commissions of the hospitals resigned as a 
sign of protest against the suspicions raised.88 However, the experts called 
                                                 
84  For more details on the legislative process that lead to this result and a comparative 
analysis between suicide, consented homicide and active direct euthanasia, see E. Diaz 
Aranda, “Dogmatica del suicidio y homicidio consentido”, Madrid, 1995, pp. 55-81 
and 217-255. The author argues that the punishment of consented homicide does not 
merely aim at preventing that someone loses his/her life, it aims at prohibiting that 
someone who is able to commit suicide uses the help of a third person to die. There-
fore, those who are not able to commit suicide by themselves (e.g., quadriplegics, as 
in the case of Ramón Sampedro) may, in respect of the principle of equality, ask to be 
killed by someone without that person being criminally punished (p. 237).  
85  Law 41/2002, 14 November 2002 on patient’s autonomy and rights and obligations 
regarding medical information, cit. in, Service des études juridiques du Sénat, “Étude 
de législation comparée n° 139, novembre 2004 – Les droits du malade en fin de vie”, 
pp. 27-28, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc139/lc139.pdf>. 
86  Étude de législation comparée n° 139, novembre 2004 – Les droits du malade en fin 
de vie, Service des études juridiques du Sénat, pp. 28-29, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc 
139/lc139.pdf>. 
87  “11 preguntas sobre el caso ‘Severo Ochoa’”, <http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1529 
9/0/lamela/leganes/hospital/>. 
88  “Dimiten todos los médicos de las comisiones internas del Hospital Severo Ochoa en 
Leganés”, <http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/19055/0/severo/ochoa/leganes/>.  
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upon to investigate the allegations did conclude that there were 73 cases of 
“inadequate or not recommended” sedations89 and 4 physicians related there-
with were, as a consequence, moved a disciplinary process.90 Although this 
situation indicated that passive euthanasia is commonly accepted by health 
care providers, Prime-Minister Zapatero declared that the executive had no in-
tention of amending the Spanish legislation to legalise euthanasia.91 
5. Switzerland 
Assisted suicide is legal, as long as the author is not driven by a selfish motive 
(in accordance with Article 115 Penal Code, e contrario).92 Furthermore, the 
ASSM Directives, i.e., the medical-ethic directives of the Swiss Medical Sci-
ences Academy on medical assistance to patients at the end of life or suffering 
from extreme brain problems, play a very important role. Although these do 
not have legal value, the political authorities recognise their suppletive legal 
validity and courts refer to their dispositions. Therefore, the fact that these di-
rectives allow both passive euthanasia and indirect active euthanasia leads au-
thorities to consider these practices lawful.93 Interestingly enough, according 
to these rules, and as far as passive euthanasia goes, the notion of life-
sustaining treatment that can be withheld includes, among others, artificial hy-
dration and feeding, administration of oxygen, assisted breathing, medication, 
blood transfusion and dialysis.  
Finally, both directives from the Swiss Medical Sciences Academy and 
several of the Swiss cantons have approved legislation recognising the validity 
of living wills, which had been, in any case, already previously recognised by 
the courts.94 Active euthanasia remains prohibited, even upon request from the 
patient. 
In recent years, Switzerland has become famous for facilitating what is 
called by harsh criticizers as the ‘death tourism’: terminally-ill patients travel 
                                                 
89  “Hubo 73 casos de sedaciones irregulares en el Severo Ochoa, según el informe de los 
expertos”, <http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/26838/0/sedaciones/severo/ochoa/>. 
90  “Expediente ‘en suspenso’ para cuatro médicos de Leganés”, <http://www.20minutos. 
es/noticia/28089/0/Expediente/suspenso/medicos/>. 
91  “Zapatero asegura que el Gobierno no legalizará la eutanasia”, <http://www.20 
minutos.es/noticia/17268/0/eutanasia/zapatero/legalizacion/>. 
92  See answer to question II.9 of COE, op. cit. 
93  See the Swiss answer to question II.5 of COE, op. cit. 
94  Among which those of Valais, Geneva, Lucerne, Neuchatel and Zurich. See Service 
des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation comparée nº 
49”, January 1999, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49_mono.html>. 
  36
to that country in order to be allowed to die through medical assistance which 
is denied in their own countries.95 Regardless of this, according to surveys 
conducted for the last decade, between 75% and 80% of the population is fa-
vourable to active euthanasia.96 In addition, a parliamentary motion has been 
presented on June 2005, in order to legislate the practice of passive and indi-
rect euthanasia.97 
6. The Netherlands98 
The Netherlands is the ultimate paradigm of euthanasia in practice in today’s 
world. The Medical Association of Netherlands is the only one in the world to 
accept that medical practices consist of healing and promoting health, but also 
helping patients achieve a peaceful and dignified death. Generally, no great 
moral distinction between ending one’s life and taking that of others is drawn, 
as long as the criteria set in the law have been satisfied. 
The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Proce-
dures) Act was adopted in 12 April 2001 and came into force on 1 April 
2002.99 100 The Netherlands became, then, the first country in the world to le-
galise active euthanasia, a practice that had been tolerated in this country for 
more than twenty years already.101 85% of the Dutch population supported the 
approval of this Act.102 
Euthanasia or assisted suicide is not regarded as an offence if certain condi-
tions are met. Both euthanasia and assisted suicide are still considered criminal 
offences (Articles 293 and 294 Criminal Code), but, as a consequence of the 
                                                 
95  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2782887.stm> and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
health/3623874.stm>. The same is said to happen in relation to the Netherlands, al-
though in smaller proportions: Abigail Levene/Reuters, Público, 1 April 2002, p. 19. 
96  See Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation 
comparée nº 49”, January 1999, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49_mono.html>. 
97  <http://www.parlament.ch/afs/data/f/gesch/2005/f_gesch_20053352.htm>. 
98  For a deeper analysis of some aspects of the Dutch legal regime and its evolution, 
such as the necessity defence and the concepts of ‘hopeless and unbearable suffering’ 
and ‘existential suffering’, see U. de Vries, “A Dutch perspective: the limits of lawful 
euthanasia”, 13 Annals Health L. 365, 2004. 
99  “Wet van 12 April 2001 houdende toetsing van levensbeëindiging op verzoek van 
hulp bij zelfdoding en wijziging van het wetboek van strafrecht en van de wet op 
lijkbezorging”, Implementation Decree published in the Bulletin of Acts, Orders and 
Decrees (Staatsblad) 2002, 165. 
100  See answer to question II.5 of COE, op. cit. 
101  Público, 12 April 2001. 
102  Inês Nadais, “O dia um da eutanásia na Holanda”, Público, 2 April 2002, p. 22. 
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amendment introduced by this Act to these articles, the responsible physician 
is not prosecuted if he/she has observed the due care criteria listed in section 2 
of the Act and reported his/her intervention to the municipal pathologist. The 
criteria are the following:103 
a) there are voluntary, well-considered, persistent, and explicit requests for 
euthanasia (including under the form of anticipated written requests from 
patients who are at least sixteen years old);104 
a) the physician informs the patient about his/her situation and his/her pros-
pects; 
b) according to prevailing medical opinion, patient’s suffering is unbearable 
and without prospect of improvement; 
c) the physician and the patient discussed alternatives to euthanasia and have 
agreed that there is no other foreseeable solution; 
d) the doctor consulted at least one other physician with an independent 
point of view, who must have seen the patient and given a written opinion 
on the due care criteria; 
e) euthanasia was performed in accordance with good medical practice. 
As already mentioned, the physician reports to the municipal pathologist the 
euthanasia or assisted suicide act that he/she has practiced. This report is ex-
tremely detailed and has to give exhaustive answers to all essential aspects re-
garding the disease, the request for euthanasia, the consultation of an-
other/other physician/s and the carrying out of the euthanasia itself.105 Then, 
the municipal pathologist reports the case to the regional review committee, 
which assesses whether the attending physician acted in accordance with the 
due care criteria. If he/she is found to have respected such criteria, the report is 
put into archive, otherwise the committee presents its findings to the Public 
Prosecution Service, which decides whether or not to prosecute. When a phy-
sician has not respected the criteria set in the law, he/she can be sentenced to 
12 years imprisonment, subject to verification.106 
This Act does not address: 
– withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment; 
                                                 
103  See answer to question II.19 of COE, op. cit. 
104  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 109”, July 2002, p. 12, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.pdf>. 
105  Ibidem, pp. 14-17. 
106  European Union Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), 
op. cit., p. 32, <http://www.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/cridho/CFR-CDF.Report2002.en.pdf>. 
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– alleviation of pain and symptoms with an unintended life-shortening ef-
fect; 
– medical interventions to terminate life without an explicit request by the 
patient; 
– neonates – they are excluded from the scope of this law and only persons 
aged 12 or older may request euthanasia or assisted suicide, although 
cases involving minors have to respect stricter criteria: parents or guard-
ian’s consent, until the age of 15, or at least consultation of these, be-
tween the age of 16 and 18. These rules are in harmony with the law re-
garding the patient’s consent to medical treatment, in force since 1995 
and incorporated in the civil code.107 
The Dutch government has made clear that this law does not, in any way, need 
to be amended as a consequence of the above-mentioned Pretty case at the 
ECtHR.108 In fact, this law was considered to be compatible with Article 2 
ECHR, since, according to the Dutch rules, there is no ‘right to euthanasia’ and 
doctors cannot be obliged to accede to requests of euthanasia. Besides that, the 
Dutch legal regime strikes a balance between the protection to the right to life 
and personal autonomy, whose importance the ECtHR underlined. At any rate, 
the Pretty case decision stated itself that, although the English legal solution 
was justifiable, “that is not to say that no other law or application would be 
consistent with the Convention, it is simply that the present legislative and 
practical regime do not offend the Convention”.109 
In fact, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) has decided in the so-called 
Brongersma case, in December 2002, that the mere repeated request for termi-
nation of life does not suffice.110 The patient in this case was not terminally ill, 
but simply “tired of living”. These circumstances do not allow removal of phy-
sician’s culpability, since the objective criteria established by Dutch law was 
not respected. Therefore, the right to personal autonomy sometimes has to cede 
to the protection of the right to life and euthanasia is still criminally punishable 
under certain circumstances.  
In 2004, the Dutch Authorities promoted a new independent study to assess 
how the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Proce-
                                                 
107  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 109”, July 2002, pp. 11-12, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.pdf>. 
108  See supra footnote no. 22. 
109  § 30 Pretty v. the United Kingdom (application no. 2346/02), European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 29 April 2002. 
110  Hoge Raad, no. 00797/02, 24 December 2002, NJ (Dutch Law Reports) 2003, 167. 
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dures) Act was working in practice.111 It focused, in particular, on terminal se-
dation, experience with the review procedure, notification behaviour and the 
relationship between euthanasia and palliative care.112 Some problems specifi-
cally addressed by this study were the due care criteria, review procedures, no-
tification of euthanasia and assisted suicide, requests from patients without any 
serious physical or psychiatric disorder, patients suffering from senile demen-
tia who have previously drawn up advance directives, minors, action to end life 
where no express request has been made, and sedation of dying patients.113 
This study has found that:114 
– Some 500 general practitioners have been trained to provide independent 
assessments to the physician attending the patient and they have been 
found to give better assessments – such training should, in the future, be 
extended to hospital specialists and doctors working in nursing homes. 
– Assessing how unbearable is the suffering of the patient is the most diffi-
cult element of the due care criteria. 
– Even in the cases where doctors do not fulfil all due criteria, the Public 
Prosecution Service finds that disciplinary action may be more appropri-
ate than criminal proceedings when the due criteria not followed is merely 
formal or procedural. 
– There is an increased readiness from doctors to notify cases of euthanasia 
and assisted suicide, which is seen to help increase both public acceptance 
of medical action to terminate life on request and the quality of medical 
decision-making in this respect – still, it is known that some doctors do 
not notify all cases, be it due to the doctor-patient relationship or to the 
circumstances of the individual case. 
– Since dementia is not in itself a sufficient ground for termination of life 
on request and physicians are under no obligation to comply with a re-
quest for euthanasia recorded in an advance directive, physicians are ex-
tremely cautious in relation to advance directives of patients with demen-
tia and very often do not honour the expressed wishes of patients. 
– Euthanasia in the case of minors is rare and the decision is taken with ut-
                                                 
111  See Comments by the Government of the Netherlands on the concluding observations 
of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/CO/72/NET), International Covenant on the 
Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, CCPR/ 
CO/72/NET/Add.3, 16 December 2004.  
112  Ibidem, p. 3. 
113  Ibidem.  
114  Ibidem, pp. 3-12. 
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most care and always with the parents’ involvement: it only occurred in 
0,7% of all child deaths and it usually only takes place in cases of can-
cer115 – still, concern regarding non-reporting of cases and failure of con-
trol in what regards minors subsists.116 117 
– Although physicians very often do not realise it, patients sedation many 
times resembles termination of life on request, then becoming what can 
be called ‘terminal sedation’; therefore, these cases should be notified and 
reviewed and it is advisable to produce guidelines which will clarify the 
practice of sedation. 
– Finally, the report advices further developments in palliative care and ex-
pertise in terminal care, since they may render many cases of euthanasia 
unnecessary (although the palliative care policy has already stepped up in 
the last years and 61% of the physicians believe that euthanasia will have 
a place no matter how good the care and support for the terminally ill and 
of adequate pain relief may be). 
This report concludes that the main focus should centre on increasing compli-
ance with the due care criteria, which has anyway been found to have in-
creased since 1995.118 The growing transparency clearly shows how positive it 
can be to adopt legislation regulating medical practices already occurring (such 
as euthanasia, be it passive, indirect or active), rather than forbidding them and 
turning the back to their illegal practice. 
As we have seen, concerns about abuses and slippages in the Dutch practice 
                                                 
115  The report adds that in 2% of these cases the patient had not requested euthanasia, 
since sometimes a neonate was at stake. This is in contradiction to the fact that neo-
nates are excluded from the application of this law, as above mentioned (see also Ser-
vice des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 109”, July 2002, pp. 11-12, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.pdf>). 
116  Report on the thirty-fifth session of the Commission on the Rights of the Child (12-30 
January 2004), p. 68, <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/415/ 
37/pdf/G0441537.pdf?OpenElement>. 
117  R. L. Marker, “Assisted Suicide: Not for Adults Only?”, <http://www.international 
taskforce.org/noa.htm>. 
118  Already before 1995, public awareness regarding the non-reporting of euthanasia 
cases was raised due to a case of a physician who practiced forgery and fraud in order 
to avoid notifying the municipal authorities that he had practiced euthanasia. The phy-
sician at stake was considered guilty of taking another person’s life at the person’s re-
quest, falsifying, in his capacity as physician, a death certificate as regards the cause 
of a person’s death, and falsifying prescriptions, and was condemned to a suspended 
term of imprisonment of six months and a fine of 50,000 Netherlands guilders (Re-
gional Court of Rotterdam, 11 May 1995, cit. in Zoon v. The Netherlands, Application 
no. 29202/95, 7 December 2000, ECtHR).  
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of euthanasia regard non-reporting of cases and the consequential impossibility 
to verify whether the criteria has been satisfied, as well as high level of non-
compliance of all legal criteria in the cases reported. But even if the Dutch ex-
perience shows the difficulty of holding the line against slippage across the 
most crucial established criteria, it is also clear that the nightmare slippery 
slope scenarios of ending up with anything like nazi-style mass involuntary 
euthanasia have not materialised. Moreover, the harsh analysis of the Dutch 
legal solution that some authors provide119 can hardly be upheld, since there is 
no thorough data on the same parameters in other countries as the Dutch sur-
veys offer, which impairs any comprehensive or ultimate conclusion on, let 
alone condemnation of, the Dutch policy regarding euthanasia. 
Finally, it is legitimate to wonder why the Netherlands have taken the lead 
in establishing progressive rules regarding the practice of euthanasia. The most 
relevant reasons that have been pointed out pertain the religious and social fea-
tures of the Dutch: a tradition of religious and moral tolerance has contributed 
to a democratic and permissive society, where people are fiercely independent, 
value moral integrity and eagerly defend civil liberties. Furthermore, the key-
role of the family doctor (who is very often not only a professional, but also a 
family friend) and the characteristics of the legal system (absence of a mini-
mum level of punishment) have also added strength to the legalisation of 
euthanasia.120  
C. Voices from the Common Law World 
1. Australia 
The awareness regarding the problems relating to the need to respect patients’ 
self-determination was raised already in the 80’s in Australia. In fact, in 1988 
two Australian states legalised living wills and in 1994 and 1995 two other 
states adopted laws foreseeing the designation of a proxy with the power to re-
fuse medical treatment in case the patient loses capacity thereto.121 Subse-
quently, the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 came into force in the 
Northern Territories in July 1996.122 However, the Euthanasia Laws Bill over-
                                                 
119  See, e.g., J. Keown, “Euthanasia, ethics and public policy: an argument against legali-
sation”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et. al. 2002, pp. 136-149. 
120  See M. Otlowski, op. cit., pp. 448-450. 
121  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
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turned it in March 1997.123 The Northern Territory law allowed passive and 
active euthanasia, as well as assisted suicide, and, during the two years that it 
was in force, four people died as a result of the administration of a lethal dose 
of intravenous drugs by one medical practitioner.124 
In reality, both passive and indirect euthanasia were known to be practiced 
until this moment without giving raise to any punishment. The number of pa-
tients who died as a consequence of these practices was around 30% of the total 
number of deaths, according to surveys conducted in 1994 and 1997.125 Passive 
euthanasia, in particular, had even been codified in several Australian states, 
such as Victoria, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory, and South 
Australia, through regulation admitting the validity of living wills stating the re-
fusal of future medical interventions under certain circumstances.126 However, 
the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1997 raised quite some uncertainty in regards to the 
lawfulness of these practices, above all, in what concerns indirect euthanasia. 
In 2002, this uncertainty exploded into a much-publicised case. On 22 May 
2002, Nancy Crick, a 70-year-old woman, committed suicide in the presence of 
21 friends and relatives. She allegedly suffered from cancer (which turned out 
to be an “inoperable twisted bowel” at the end) and could not bear the pain 
anymore.127 This case raised a debate on the legalisation of assisted suicide, 
allowing for passionate interventions.128 At the end, none of the presents at the 
suicide of Nancy Crick was prosecuted.129 At any rate, this case could shape a 
homicide through omission, but never euthanasia or assisted suicide, since 
Nancy Crick took the poison by herself, without assistance from the presents.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that in all surveys that have taken place 
in the last years, approximately 75% of Australians are favourable to the le-
galisation of active euthanasia. Moreover, courts hardly ever condemn physi-
cians or relatives who have committed homicide for compassion and the 
prosecution authorities rarely consider opportune to prosecute in cases of as-
sisted suicide.130 
                                                 
123  Euthanasia Laws Act 1997, of 23 March 1997, <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/ 
Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/484CEDAD0DB7D221CA256F720018A878?OpenDocument>. 
124  Ibidem. 
125  Ibidem. 
126  Ibidem. 
127  <http://www.vesv.org.au/docs/crick050602.htm>. 
128  See, e.g., D. van Gend, “Euthanasia: Nancy Crick - what is the real story?”,   
<http://www.newsweekly.com.au/articles/2002jun15_crick.html>. 
129  <http://www.abc.net.au/brisbane/stories/s1135200.htm>. 
130  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 49”, January 1999, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49_mono.html>. 
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2. England131 
As already mentioned, in 1935 there were already organized movements to le-
galise voluntary euthanasia in England. Although there is not a specific legisla-
tion in England regarding euthanasia, courts assimilate these cases to homi-
cide, resorting to the Homicide Act 1957. In this line, there have been a num-
ber of convictions of family members who have performed euthanasia. How-
ever, these persons have generally been found to have diminished responsibil-
ity and, if convicted at all, have been convicted of manslaughter (which re-
quires only recklessness, traditionally seen as deliberately taking an unjustified 
risk)132 and some of them have not even been sentenced to prison. In addition, 
the Suicide Act 1961 prohibits assisted suicide. Its Article 2 states that every 
person who helps, encourages, recommends or allows the suicide of a third 
person is punishable with maximum 14 years imprisonment.  
As for indirect and passive euthanasia, the English courts have been more 
lenient and have long accepted its practice. In 1957, the decision of the case 
involving Dr. John Bodkin Adams133 argued already the legitimacy of indirect 
euthanasia, which was also supported by the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Medical Ethics in 1994.134 On the other hand, passive euthanasia finds sup-
port in the right of the patient to self-determination regarding life and therapeu-
tic relentlessness.  
Already by 1975 it was admitted that the courts had to pay more attention to 
what the medical practice in fact was: “A doctor may be charged with man-
slaughter but hope for a conditional discharge. It might be asked whether reli-
ance upon a court to grant a conditional discharge does not place both the court 
and the doctor in the moral dilemma which should be resolved by the commu-
nity: is voluntary euthanasia permissible or not? It is perhaps to be seen as a 
pragmatic approach, based on recognition of the fact that voluntary euthanasia 
does now take place, and settling the limiting conditions for it”.135 
In 1993, the Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland case136 set the criterion which 
were to be used in the future in all cases regarding euthanasia. The court had to 
decide on the interruption of artificial feeding and hydration of a patient in per-
                                                 
131  In general, see ibidem, p. 9. 
132  P. W. D. Redmond and P. Shears, “General Principles of English Law”, seventh edi-
tion, The M & E Handbook Series, pp. 373 and 374.  
133  H. Palmer, “Dr Adams’ trial for murder”, Crim Law Rev 1957:365-377. 
134  Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics (1993-94) HL 21-I. 
135  “On dying well”, Church Information office, 1975. 
136  Chamber of Lords, 9 February 1993, AC 789. 
  44
sistent vegetative state since 1989. The main guiding principles to be consid-
ered in this field were considered to be the following: 
– the prescription of a lethal substance is forbidden; 
– the right to refuse treatment is a fundamental freedom; 
– the right to refuse treatment also refers to life-saving treatments. 
The best interests criteria was also used to decide whether or not to disconnect 
the life-sustaining machine. As in so many cases in several jurisdictions, the 
court tried to overcome contradictory arguments and incoherence in the tradi-
tional legal reasoning. Although at the end artificial feeding to the patient was 
removed, Lord Browne-Wilkinson insisted in pointing out his dismay: "How 
can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, although painlessly over a pe-
riod of weeks from lack of food but unlawful to produce his immediate death 
by a lethal injection?"137 
From the guiding principles that came out from Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. 
Bland derives that physicians cannot be prosecuted when passive euthanasia 
takes place, as long as they inform the patient properly about all therapeutic 
alternatives and consequences of ceasing medical treatment. Furthermore, 
these principles should also apply to the people who foresee that they will be in 
a persistent vegetative condition or similar and who express their will not be 
subjected to any medical treatment, not even artificial feeding.138 This expres-
sion of will, i.e., a living will, was considered to be valid by the courts if the 
patient:139 
– had the necessary discernment when he/she expressed refusal of treat-
ment; 
– finds him/herself in the exact situation that he/she foresaw in his/her ex-
pression of will; 
– fully assessed the consequences of such refusal of treatment; 
– was not morally influenced by any other person at the moment of taking 
the decision. 
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The British Medical Association reinforced the binding value of living wills in 
its deontological code published in 1995.140 141 However, since there is no 
thorough legal regulation of previous consent of incapable patients, the legal 
value of such consent may still give rise to uncertainties under some circum-
stances. In any case, even when the patient has not produced any living will, 
the medical team and the relatives of the patient may decide to cease the pre-
scription of medication, as well as, although more controversially, the artificial 
feeding and hydration.142 Regarding this issue specifically, the British Medical 
Association has made clear that “the important factor making withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration ethically acceptable is not the label attached to 
the condition or state, but the loss of specific and definable neurological path-
ways, the result of which is the permanent loss of sensitivity to external stimuli 
and loss of sentience”.143 
Following raising debate and controversy about the inflexibility of the case 
law, the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics considered 
euthanasia in depth and reported in 1994.144 This report concluded that it was 
not advisable amending the law, neither in order to allow the practice of eutha-
nasia, nor to create a specific infraction of homicide for compassion.145 Soon 
after, the government itself supported this report. Despite this, a consultation 
from the British Medical Association (BMA) on “Euthanasia and physician as-
sisted suicide: Do the moral arguments differ?”, from April 1998, has revealed 
how divided medical professionals feel in regards to these issues: “Within the 
profession there is a very wide range of views on physician assisted suicide 
                                                 
140  See also “End of life decisions - views of the BMA”, June 2000, <http://www.bma.org. 
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(both for and against)”, concludes the British Medical Association.146  
The well-known Pretty case, already described above, went through a long 
judicial journey, having been analysed by the High Court, the House of Lords 
and the ECtHR. In 2002, another case reached the media and became a mile-
stone in the evolution of the euthanasia legal regime in England.147 The High 
Court ruled that the ventilator that was keeping Miss B alive could be switched 
off, turning its back on previous case law. Miss B was completely conscious, 
provided a repeated request and informed consent. As Miss B’s defence lawyer 
stressed out, the legal distinction between his client and Mrs Pretty was a 
“technicality”, which “does not have any bearing on the real world”.148 Miss B 
was the first British citizen to request withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
while still conscious. All previous cases that had reached English courts up to 
this point regarded solely patients in persistent vegetative condition.149 
More recently, Lord Joffe made a proposal for an Assisted Dying Bill150. 
This bill provided for a competent adult suffering from a terminal disease or a 
serious, incurable physical illness to request medical assistance to die.151 This 
Bill was referred to a Select Committee152, which, in its final report, found that 
the “Bill cannot be considered adequately in the present session due to short-
age of Parliamentary time, and we therefore recognise that it cannot proceed”. 
The Committee went on saying that, if a Bill with a similar aim is again pre-
sented to the House of Lords, it “should distinguish clearly between assisted 
suicide and voluntary euthanasia and thereby give the House the opportunity to 
address these two courses of action separately, as the considerations involved 
in each are very different”. Finally, the report stated that the bill should define 
better the actions which a doctor may and may not take, as well as set in a 
more consistent way all requirements. Despite over 80% support from the 
population to such a bill153, even if it had been discussed in the Parliament, it 
would probably not have found enough support154, just as it happened in 10 
December 1997 to the bill the member of the parliament Joe Ashton proposed. 
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3. New Zealand 
In 2003, the Death with Dignity Bill was rejected by the New Zealand parlia-
ment, by 60 votes to 57.155 More recently, a new event again raised the issue 
of euthanasia in this country: Andrew Morris, a man who suffered from pro-
gressive bulbar palsy, a motor neuronal disease, died on 9 March 2005, after 
having starved himself to death.156 Andrew Morris “planned to stop eating 
while he could still feed himself”, since he did not wish anyone to be crimi-
nally punished for helping him to die.157 The person in charge of taking care of 
him, Phillipa Grace, respected the patient’s will and only gave him water until 
he died; she is now being investigated by the Public Attorney in order to in-
quire a possible liability.158  
This case is another one that makes us face the extremely thin line between 
what action should be punishable or not. While it is may be true that Phillipa 
Grace had the duty of assistance and could be charged with homicide through 
omission of rescue, it is also obvious that Andrew Morris merely exercised his 
right to self-determination. It seems to us that this vivid example of patient 
autonomy has the ability to illustrate how the conservative interpretation of 
traditional criminal law rules has to be put into cause and, above all, reformed. 
4. United States of America (USA) 
The right to self-determination of the patient is ranked highly in the USA. The 
Patient Self Determination Act 1990 imposed an obligation on all physicians 
delivering medical care in services who receive federal funds to inform pa-
tients of their right to refuse treatment and on the possibility of producing a liv-
ing will.159 Besides that, all American states have adopted laws recognising to 
each person the right to express in advance his/her refusal to therapeutic relent-
lessness, either by producing a living will or by designating a proxy with deci-
sion-making power regarding medical issues.160 The following rights have 
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been generally recognised: 
– non-resuscitation orders; 
– declarations demanding the non-administration or the interruption of life-
prolonging procedures; 
– delegations to a third party to make all the decisions concerning his/her 
health. 
In the case of patients who do not have the capacity to consent nor have left a 
living will, withdrawing or withholding medical treatment depends on estab-
lishing beyond doubt the patient’s will.161  
This said, the situation regarding all euthanasia related issues in several 
states of the USA is extremely controversial. Although euthanasia is forbidden 
in all states of the USA, there have been numerous cases of court acquittals 
throughout history, based mostly on the right to self-determination. Moreover, 
thousands of deaths everyday are alleged to be in some way planned, tolerated 
or indirectly assisted, probably through the double effect of pain-solving medi-
cations that hasten death, or the withdrawal of or failure of start potentially 
life-prolonging or life-saving treatments. In addition, the financial situation of 
the patient can also play an important role, since there is no universal medical 
care. The economic plight of the families of terminally ill patients can be des-
perate.162 163 
As one can read in the decision Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health, it is agreed that “a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment may be inferred from (…) prior decisions, and that the re-
fusal or artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty 
interest”.164 However, in the lack of a living will, the situation can become 
more complex. Besides that, the lack of proof regarding the true will of the pa-
tient in case of falling into a vegetative state can lead to denial of withdrawal 
of life-sustaining procedures. In cases of doubt, the states’ interest in protect-
ing life can legitimise “heightened evidentiary requirements” and override the 
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right to liberty of the patient.165 This perspective is, nevertheless, very much 
disputed, even among the collective of judges taking such a decision, as one of 
them stated: 
“[If] Nancy Cruzan has no interest in continued treatment, and if she has a lib-
erty interest in being free from unwanted treatment, and if the cessation of 
treatment would have no adverse impact on third parties, and if no reason ex-
ists to doubt the good faith of Nancy’ parents, then what possible basis could 
the State have for insisting upon continued medical treatment?”166 
In 1994, the voters of Oregon approved for the first time, in referendum, the law 
legalising assisted suicide. After a long court process, which had the effect of 
suspending its implementation, the law came into force in November 1997.167 
The Death with Dignity Act made physician-assisted suicide lawful for the first 
time in the world, so long as it is conforms with certain specifications:168 
– the patient is 18 years of age or older and is a resident in Oregon; 
– the patient is terminally ill; 
                                                 
165  Ibidem, pp. 575 and 576.  
166  Ibidem, p. 577. 
167  The Federal Controlled Substance Act states that before a controlled substance can be 
distributed for legitimate medical purposes, one must obtain a license from the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. This agency had proposed forbidding physicians from 
prescribing such drugs with the intent of causing death. Although Janet Reno, while 
attorney general, refused to accept such measure, her successor, John Ashcroft agreed 
that physicians who prescribed controlled substances for assisted suicide were violat-
ing this Act, since assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical practice. Oregon’s 
practice of assisted suicide was blocked as a consequence of the federal government’s 
interpretation of this Act (see answer to question II. 8 of COE, op. cit.). Although this 
measure only prohibited the prescription of a particular class of drugs, the result of 
such prohibition was indeed hindering physicians from practicing assisted suicide: 
helping patients to commit suicide through the prescription of other drugs could bring 
serious harm upon them. Several Oregon state authorities, such as its governor, John 
Kitzhaber, and responsible for justice, Hardy Meyers, protested against this “federal 
interference without precedents in the Oregon State capacity to regulate medical prac-
tice” (“Fim do suicídio assistido no estado americano do Oregon”, Público, 8th No-
vember 2001, p. 36). The State of Oregon filed a lawsuit against this federal decision 
and obtained a temporary restraining order against Ashcroft’s ruling. In 2002, the US 
District Court upheld Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law, which has remained in 
force until now despite all appeals meanwhile filed by Ashcroft (Oregon response to 
U.S. Department of Justice opinion on physician assisted suicide, <http://www.doj. 
state.or.us/11072001.htm>). 
168  “The Oregon Death with Dignity Act”, <http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/statute. 
pdf>. 
  50
– the patient has less than six months left to live; 
– the patient is of sound mind (competent at the time of the request); 
– the patient explored all treatment options; 
– the patient made two voluntary requests to die, both orally and written, 
and witnessed, with a 15 days interval; 
– two doctors agree that these conditions are obtained and that the patient 
does not in anyway suffer from a psychiatric or psychological disturbance 
(e.g., too depressed) that impairs his/her judgment about seeking to die. 
In such cases, patients may obtain a lethal dose of drugs after a fifteen-day 
waiting period, and can proceed to commit suicide. Doctors may, but are never 
obliged to, assist by prescribing the barbiturates, but not administer them or 
carry out any lethal procedure. Doctors are, furthermore, requested to inform 
the patient of feasible alternatives to assisted suicide, such as comfort care, 
hospice care and pain control, as well as requesting the patient to inform 
his/her next-of-kin. Lastly, the patient may rescind his/her request at any time, 
which is also remembered by the doctor. The possibility of resorting to as-
sisted-suicide is, therefore, left to qualified patients and licensed physicians.  
The Oregon Department of Human Services collects and analyses informa-
tion on how the law works in practice and issues an annual report assessing 
compliance with the terms of the Act.169 This is done through a compulsory 
reporting system, according to which doctors inform these Services of each 
prescription of lethal medication. When doctors do not comply with these 
rules, they are subjected to disciplinary action from the Board of Medical Ex-
aminers. Furthermore, pharmacists must also be informed of the ultimate use 
of the drugs prescribed. According to the last report produced by the Oregon 
Department of Human Services170, patients requesting lethal medication re-
ferred to 3 main concerns: decreasing ability to participate in activities that 
made life enjoyable, loss of autonomy and a loss of dignity.171 The other pos-
sible concerns (financial impact of illness, being a burden, loss of control of 
bodily functions and inadequate pain control) were given less importance. Al-
though the number of people resorting to physician-assisted suicide has been 
increasing since 1998, the overall number of terminally ill patients actually us-
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ing it only amounts to about one in every 800 deaths (representing 0,125% of 
the annual deaths).172 Another important element consists of no unreported 
cases having been identified, not only according to the authorities, but also to 
several authors, which can be interpreted as meaning that the Act is well en-
forced. More importantly, the Oregon Health Division could not find any sign 
of abuse, nor any influence of financial burden of their disease as a reason for 
the patients’ choice. Finally, the availability of physician-assisted suicide has 
had the very positive impact of increasing physicians’ awareness in regards to 
end-of-life care options, such as pain medications in the terminally ill, recogni-
tion of disorders such as depression and reference of patients to hospices. 
Two types of cases are still never satisfied by this law’s criteria, since it ex-
pressly excludes euthanasia: 
– patients who cannot obtain the requisite medication or administer it to 
themselves (due to paralysis, weakness caused by the medication or in-
ability to swallow); 
– patients who are not presently suffering and who are likely to die within 
six months, but who fear the ravages of a mentally incapacitating condi-
tion (such as Alzheimer’s disease) that will rob them of the competence 
needed for any request for physician-assisted suicide to be granted. 
Meanwhile, in 1997, two Supreme Court decisions ruled that there is no fed-
eral constitutional right to assisted suicide, so it became a policy matter left to 
each individual state in the USA.173 The reasoning of one of them, Washington 
v. Glucksberg174, supported that the Washington state prohibition against 
“causing” or “aiding” a suicide did not offend the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the USA.175 The Court of Appeal had previously stated that “the Constitution 
encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner 
of one’s death” and that the state’s ban on assisted suicide was unconstitutional 
“as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten their deaths 
with medication prescribed by their physicians”.176 However, the Supreme 
Court quashed this decision, claiming that “State’s assisted-suicide bans (…) 
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are longstanding expressions of the State’s commitment to the protection and 
preservation of all human life”.177 The Supreme Court had stated in the Cru-
zan case that “competent, dying persons have the right to direct the removal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment and thus hasten death” and that “the constitu-
tional principle behind recognizing the patient’s liberty to direct the with-
drawal of artificial life support applies at least as strongly to the choice to has-
ten impending death by consuming lethal medication”.178 Still, in the Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg decision, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that “the 
decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as per-
sonal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it 
has never enjoyed similar legal protection”.179 Besides that, “the asserted 
‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause” and it is unquestionable that the “Wash-
ington’s assisted suicide ban [is] rationally related to legitimate government 
interests”.180 A concurring opinion argued that, while he “would not say as a 
categorical matter that these state interests are invalid as to the entire class of 
terminally ill, mentally competent patients, [he does] not [foreclose] the possi-
bility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose 
assistance was sought could prevail in a more particularized challenge”.181 In 
any case, the main outcome of this case was that the law banning assisted sui-
cide in the State of Washington was not considered unconstitutional. 
In the other case, Vacco v. Quill, the court discussed if the New York 
state’s assisted suicide prohibition offended the Equal Protection Clause, since 
“some terminally ill people – those on life-support systems – are treated differ-
ently than those who are not, in that the former may ‘hasten death’ by ending 
treatment, but the latter may not ‘hasten death’ through physician-assisted sui-
cide”.182 Besides that, and also according to the respondents claim, the distinc-
tion between refusing life saving medical treatment and assisted suicide is “ar-
bitrary” and “irrational”.183 However, the Supreme Court found that assisting 
suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is a “widely recognized and 
endorsed” distinction, besides being “certainly rational”, even if “the line be-
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tween the two may not be clear”.184 As a conclusion, the New York state ban 
on assisted suicide was considered constitutional. However, another concurrent 
opinion precised that he was “not persuaded that in all cases there will in fact 
be a significant difference between the intent of the physicians, the patients or 
the families in the two situations. [In] both situations, [they may be] seeking to 
hasten a certain, impending death”.185 Furthermore, five out of the nine judges 
declined to join the opinion of the Court in its entirety, which clearly reveals a 
still very unsettled situation concerning the exact rules that should govern 
withdrawal of life saving treatment and assisted suicide in the USA. 
Despite this established case law, as well as political and medical opposi-
tion, surveys reveal that the majority of Americans are in favour of assisted 
suicide being legalised. In addition, “governmental interest’s in preserving life 
and promoting respect for the sanctity of human life” must yield before “the 
patient’s strong autonomy” (self-determination) and the “dignity factor”, to be 
included “within the criteria of best interests of any incompetent patient”.186 
Lastly, court juries tend not to condemn someone who has helped another to 
commit suicide. An exception to this trend was the famous case of Dr. 
Kevorkian. In 1998, following the videotaping and broadcasting of the suicide 
of Don Hewitt with the assistance of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the debate about 
euthanasia in the USA was re-launched and public opinion faced again a whirl 
of arguments in every direction.187 Dr. Kevorkian, who, already at that time, 
was known as “Dr. Death” for having been allegedly responsible for more than 
120 cases of euthanasia, was convicted of second degree murder and delivering 
a controlled substance without a license.188 
Of course that the most recent and live memory of the debate over euthana-
sia in the USA reminds us immediately of the Terry Schiavi case. This 41-
year-old woman died on 31st March 2005, after 15 years of being in a vegeta-
tive state as a consequence of two heart attacks and 13 days of starvation and 
dehydration. This dramatic case revolved around this issue: Who decides about 
someone’s right to die when that someone is not competent thereto anymore 
and has not left any living will? After a never-ending entanglement of court 
processes, appeals and procedural issues, the state circuit court ordered the re-
moval of the life-sustaining feeding tube and the Supreme Court rejected the 
                                                 
184  Cit. in K. M. Sullivan and G. Gunther, op. cit., pp. 588 and 589. 
185  Justice Stevens in Vacco v. Quill, cit. in K. M. Sullivan and G. Gunther, op. cit., p. 
589. 
186  N.L. Cantor, op. cit., pp. 399, 400 and 414. 
187  F. Rich (The New York Times), “L’euthanasie, parlons-en!”, Courrier International, 
no. 422, p. 24. 
188  <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kevorkian/law/>. 
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appeal against this decision: from that moment on there was no other signifi-
cant legal resource to avoid the death of Terri Schiavo.189 Her persistent vege-
tative state and alleged wishes190 lead state and federal courts to refuse the 
feeding tube to be reinserted. What was most disturbing and specific to this 
case was the media and political attention that it caught. Florida’s state senate 
was called to vote twice on bills concerning directly this case: 
– the first time in 2003 to pass what was to be called “Terri’s Law”, which 
allowed Florida’s governor to stay the judge’s order to withdraw the feed-
ing tube and was later on considered unconstitutional by the Florida Su-
preme Court;191 and, 
– the second time in 2005 to vote on a bill preventing doctors from remov-
ing a feeding tube from patients who had not expressed their wishes in 
writing, which failed.192  
More importantly, the House and Senate of the USA passed a bill transferring 
jurisdiction of the case to a US District Court for a federal judge to review. 
This was a double exceptional measure, be it for the uncommon circumstances 
that surrounded it, be it for the fact that it was only applicable to this case – a 
hardly constitutional ad personam act. Despite that, it did not produce the ex-
pected results: both the US District Court and Circuit US Court of Appeals de-
nied reinserting the feeding tube. This seven years judicial marathon involved 
20 rulings and 5 refusals of the Supreme Court to hear the case.193 One thing 
that should be retained is that the majority of the Americans condemned the 
hasty intromission of Congress in the judicial process194 and was in favour of 
the removal of the feeding tube, independently of their political or religious 
background195 196. Finally, this case also had the consequence of making peo-
                                                 
189  “May god give grace to our family”, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/03/31/ 
schiavo/index.html>. 
190  “Schiavo parents file new court appeal”, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/ 
03/30/schiavo/index.html>. 
191  “The Terri Schiavo Case Timeline”, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/30/ 
schiavo/index.html>. 
192  “Schiavo parents file new court appeal”, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/ 
03/30/schiavo/index.html>. 
193  “U.S. Supreme Court rejects Schiavo parent’s appeal”, CNN, <http://edition.cnn. 
com/2005/LAW/03/24/schiavo/index.html>. 
194  According to a poll conducted by ABC TV station, 70% of the Americans believe that 
the president and the Congress should not have interfered in this case, reported the 
“Corriere della Sera”, 22 March 2005, p. 9, and “La Reppublica”, 22 March 2005, p. 8. 
195  63%, according to a poll from ABC TV station, 59% according to Fox TV station, re-
ported the “Corriere della Sera”, 22 March 2005. p. 9, and “La Reppublica”, 22 March 
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ple much more aware of how to make sure their self-determination right during 
sickness is respected: during the days of highest controversy around the case of 
Terri Schiavo, more than 2000 people a day asked the organisation “Aging 
with dignity”197, specialised in drafting living-wills, for advice.198 
No matter if this is considered a case of voluntary or non-voluntary eutha-
nasia (depending if one considers proven that Terri Schiavo did express her 
will to die if she happened to found herself in such medical conditions or not), 
one doubt certainly raised in many people’s minds: Would it have not been 
less cruel to resort to a lethal injection than letting Terri Schiavo die to starva-
tion and thirst? Medical data points to the fact that a permanently unconscious 
patient “cannot sense pain and experiences no suffering” and that “the death 
[due to termination of artificial nutrition] will neither be painful nor grue-
some”.199 Therefore, since the patient in a permanent vegetative state “is de-
riving no gain from this biological limbo” and termination of artificial nutrition 
can be equated with medical treatment, the cessation of medical care “is con-
sistent with the patient’s best interests”, even in the absence of prior instruction 
from the patient.200 As Cantor concludes, “withholding artificial nutrition from 
a permanently unconscious patient is consistent with humane standards of care 
and does not threaten abuse of the disabled”.201 
                                                                                                                                                      
2005, p. 8. 
196  56%, according to a CNN/USA TODAY/GALLUP poll, from which 62% democrats 
and 54% republicans, and 51% attend church weekly, 55% monthly and 60% less of-
ten: “Poll: Feeding won't improve Schiavo's condition”, CNN, <http://edition.cnn. 
com/2005/LAW/03/23/schiavo.poll/index.html>. 
197  <http://www.agingwithdignity.org/>. 
198  Reported by the “La Reppublica”, 22 March 2005, p. 8. 
199  N.L. Cantor, op. cit., pp. 381-437 (especially 382). 
200  Ibidem, pp. 382-383. 
201  Ibidem, p. 384. 
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“We must be tolerant of wishes that might be different from our own. 
I might prefer to be dead than quadriplegic. You might not.  
Does that make one of us right?”202 
John M. Freeman 
VI. Attempts at Comparing the Incomparable 
The different legal regimes that were described above reveal the deep and ir-
reconcilable differences that characterise this theme in different countries. 
Even countries that have in common the legalisation of euthanasia, such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium, have followed two different paths: the first one has 
modified the penal law regarding homicide following victim’s request and sui-
cide assistance, while the second one opted for not amending the penal code 
and not referring explicitly to suicide assistance.203 Besides, in Belgium, the 
request for euthanasia has to be written and in the Netherlands, it does not.204 
One conclusion can be mentioned, as pointed out by a thorough study car-
ried out in this field by the French Senate: Denmark, several Swiss cantons, 
half of the Australian States or territories and all American States have adopted 
laws recognising to each person the right to express in advance his/her refusal 
to therapeutic relentlessness, either by producing a living will or by designat-
ing a proxy with decision-making power regarding medical issues.205 
Another thing also seems to stand out from the above description of the dif-
ferent legal regimes: the distinction between indirect, passive and active eutha-
nasia is, to most extent, pointless and senseless. As Kennedy points out206, what 
characterises the so-called indirect and active euthanasia behaviours is the same: 
– intention: to bring relief to the patient’s pain and provide him/her with a 
painless death; 
                                                 
202  Freeman, John M., “If euthanasia were licit”, in McMillan, Richard C.; Spicker, Stuart 
F.; Engelhardt Jr., Tristram Hugo; “Euthanasia and the newborn: conflicts regarding 
saving lives”, Dordrecht; D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987, p. 160. 
203  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 109”, July 2002, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc109/lc109.pdf>, pp. 4-5. 
204  Ibidem, pp. 5. 
205  Service des Affaires Européennes du Sénat, “L’euthanasie - Étude de législation com-
parée nº 49”, January 1999, <http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49_mono.html>. 
206  I. Kennedy, “Il diritto di morire”, in “Una norma giuridica per la bioetica”, a cura di 
Cosimo Marco Mazzoni, il Mulino, Bologna, 1998, pp. 217-236. 
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– motivation: to assist the patient at the best of the physician’s ability; 
– act: administration of a certain drug; 
– result: the death of the patient.  
In fact, intention is not only aiming at a specific result: the legal notion of in-
tention encompasses as well knowing that a certain result will undoubtedly 
take place following that action. And it cannot be said that, resorting to the 
German theory of the “consented risk”, indirect euthanasia remains non-
intentional killing as long as the administration of drugs remains within certain 
limits, otherwise one has, then, to answer what that limit might be. There is, 
obviously, no limit, since the pain of the patient may not have any such limits 
and require painkillers until he/she is dead.207 Therefore, indirect, as well as 
active, cases of euthanasia, are considerably more similar than one may be lead 
to believe. In addition, the presumed distinction between assisted suicide and 
the active voluntary euthanasia is, in Kennedy’s words, illusory: it easily 
crumbles both from the factual and from the moral points of view. 
Consequently, the existence of different normative and judicial solutions for 
all these cases lack sufficient legal ground. It is more a question of rhetoric208: 
neither the means (the administration of a drug), nor the result (the death of the 
patient) is considered wrong, but the rhetoric and ritual around them make all 
the difference. The criminal sanction system that enforces this rhetoric and rit-
ual are, then, wrong. Furthermore, the fact that this system aims at protecting 
the patients is patently ironic, since it is those patients themselves who wish to 
avoid being protected. 
                                                 
207  F. Giunta, op. cit., pp. 259. 
208  In the same sense, see P. Rescigno, “Autodeterminazione e testamento in vita”, in 
“Una norma giuridica per la bioetica”, a cura di Cosimo Marco Mazzoni, il Mulino, 
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“I wish merely to call attention to the fact that the issues of euthanasia arise out of 
a variety of fundamental premises, probably the most important being the extent 
of our commitment to having a benevolent and rational society.”209 
Marvin Kohl 
VII. “The future is not ours to see”, but… 
Let us suppose that a baby is born with such a defective condition that it is de-
cided that he/she ought not to be treated for the sake of his/her own quality of 
life. The infant may still survive for a long time. Why would it not be better to 
give him/her a terminating anaesthetic? It surely seems hardhearted, but is it 
not kinder than allowing slow deterioration until death arrives? It is even more 
coherent than allowing for late abortion, since with post-birth euthanasia less 
pain would be caused to the baby than with late abortion and it would be pos-
sible to better evaluate the real defective condition of the baby and determine 
his/her possibilities of future life-quality, eventually saving the baby’s life after 
all.210 
Conceiving the right to life as including the right to oppose it even against 
his/her holder is arguably compatible with a laic perspective of the State and 
with the right to self-determination: What kind of society is it that imposes life 
on people themselves without letting them decide? The right to life and the 
duty to respect others’ lives should never be at stake, but the duty to live 
should also be out of the question.  
Just as revealing one’s intention to commit suicide is an attempt to ask for 
help, the demand for euthanasia might also be an alarm about the needless and 
pointless pain and suffering that so many people are forced to go through. 
Maybe the main point of all this debate is to call attention to the inadequate 
treatments given to terminally ill patients. Better palliative care near the end of 
                                                 
209  M. Kohl, “Euthanasia and the Right to Life”, in S. F. Spicker, T. H. Engelhardt Jr., 
“Transdisciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine”, 3, Farmington, Conn., 
1975, in “Philosophical medical ethics: its nature and significance”, Dordrecht; 
Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977, p. 74. 
210  For a comprehensive view of the main problems that medical care personnel dealing 
with neo-nates have to face, see P. Deconinck, “L’euthanasie en période néonatale”, in 
Pinsart M.-G. et Susanne C. (éds.), L'euthanasie ou la mort assistée, Bruxelles, De 
Boeck, 1991, pp. 45-57. 
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life will always be preferable to death.211 However, it still remains true that le-
galising euthanasia would be the best solution for all those people that only de-
sire better care in their time of death: when asking for euthanasia to be admin-
istered to them, the family, doctor and hospital will be there to assess the rea-
sons and justification of such request. In doing so, the patient is even likely not 
to desire death anymore now that he/she is being given care and attention. 
Ironically, euthanasia can save lives. 
Many authors defend the best solution as being not to introduce any amend-
ments in the present prohibition of practices related to euthanasia, i.e., rules pun-
ishing homicide upon request and help at suicide should remain fully in force, 
even if occasionally applied in a more flexible way by the courts in order to take 
into account the specific circumstances of a case. The clear advantage of this 
approach is to recognise “the appropriateness of active voluntary euthanasia in 
individual cases, yet avoiding the dangers and difficulties in drafting legislation 
to more formally accommodate the practice”. However, it is also true that it “in-
evitably produces uncertainty and does not adequately protect the position of ei-
ther doctors or their patients”, besides the fact that “toleration of the discrepan-
cies which presently exist between the law on the books and the law in practice 
tends to lead to disrespect for the law”.212 Finally, accepting refusal of therapeu-
tic relentlessness without envisaging the application of euthanasia, mostly in the 
case of indirect and passive euthanasia, is very little realistic, since the border 
between one and the other is extremely thin.213 
                                                 
211  Expounding the relevance of palliative care within the debate on euthanasia, see M. 
Moulin, “A la recherche de la ‘bonne mort’ perdue ou la lutte des acharnements théra-
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212  M. Otlowski, op. cit., pp. 456-457. 
213  C. Mélot, “Le non acharnement thérapeutique et l’euthanasie en réanimation à l’aube 
du troisième millénaire”, Réanim Urgences, 2000, 9: 9-10.  
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“I know that our hospitals are wonderful. I know that many people have suc-
ceeded in making good lives with appalling handicaps. I’m happy for them and 
respect and admire them. But each man must make his own decision.  
And mine is to die quietly and with as much dignity as I can muster.”214 
Ken Harrison, in “Whose life is it anyway?” 
VIII. Proposals of Implementation of Progressive Rules 
Several authors have concretised specific proposal on how to implement rules 
that allow the practice of euthanasia while safeguarding the rights and interests 
of everyone involved.215 Freeman described, for example, how an ethics 
committee could work:216 
“I propose an ethics committee in each hospital[...]: 
− The composition of the committee should include representation from out-
side the medical community. 
− Any situation where death would be considered a benefit by the patient or 
the family, any situation where active or passive euthanasia is considered 
desirable, would be reviewed by the committee. 
− The wishes and desires of the patient, where available, should be given 
primacy. 
− The desires of the family should be carefully evaluated when the family 
wishes an end to the patient’s suffering[...]. 
− [...]the committee should consider this request in light of the patient’s 
disease, condition and prognosis. It should examine the family’s motives 
and assure that this is a reasonable decision. 
− In no case should the family’s desire for continued care be overruled. 
− The committee should act as the patient’s advocate, being aware and sensi-
tive to the fact that everyone will not advocate the same outcome in a 
given situation[...]. 
                                                 
214  B. Clark, “Whose life is it anyway?”, New York, Dodd Mead, 1979, pp. 76-77, cit. in 
H. Biggs, op. cit., p. 106. 
215  For a thorough set of possible alternatives of reform, see M. Otlowski, op. cit., pp. 
456-493.  
216  J. M. Freeman, op. cit., pp. 166-167. 
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− [...]assure that the decision to end life is reasonable and directed to the 
patient’s benefit – but the committee should not have dogmatic standards.” 
Morris also proposed a full “Voluntary Euthanasia Bill”, already in 1970.217 
This proposal included a whole set of rules safeguarding all consideration wor-
thy interests, such as the need for authorization, a declaration made in advance, 
the mode of revocation, duties and rights of physicians and nurses (including 
conscientious objection), as well as their protection, offences, relevance for in-
surance policies and administration of drugs. This proposal only foresaw vol-
untary euthanasia for terminally ill or severely brain damaged patients. One 
must note, of course, that proposing voluntary euthanasia for severely damaged 
patients is, to say the least, quite daring and easily object of strong criticism.  
More recently, a group of American physicians, lawyers and philosophers 
have proposed the approval of a legal act consenting assistance to death.218 
This assistance would have to be performed by physicians, could take place 
under the form of assisted suicide or active of euthanasia, depended upon the 
request of the patient, and had to be inserted in a comprehensive scheme of as-
sistance to terminal patients. This scheme would include palliative care coun-
sellors, experienced physicians, and regional committees in charge of, namely, 
monitoring palliative care and euthanasia practice.  
Regardless of these proposals, all cases of legislation legalising the practice 
of active euthanasia or assisted suicide that have been in force so far are un-
doubtedly high-quality examples of how legal rules manage to reach a very 
balanced compromise between the interests of all persons involved and the 
precautionary duties of public and political authorities. This is mostly the case 
of legislation in Belgium and The Netherlands. 
                                                 
217  A. A. Morris; “Voluntary Euthanasia”, Washington Law Review, 1970, pp. 239 ff. 
218  F.G. Miller, T.E. Quill, H. Brody et al., “Regulating physician-assisted death”, in N. 
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“I, as well as some judges and the majority of the people who love life and free-
dom, think that life is a right, not an obligation (…) denying the private property 
of our own being is the biggest cultural lie. For a culture that considers sacred 
private property over things – among which earth and water – it is an aberration 
denying the most private property of all, our Land and personal Kingdom. Our 
body, life and conscience. Our Universe.”219 
Ramón Sampedro 
IX. Summing up 
Belgium, Denmark The Netherlands and Switzerland make up the group of 
countries that step forward and admit allowing, at least, “passive euthanasia” 
or assisted suicide within their borders. However, most any other country ac-
cepts the validity of living wills, allow withdrawing of life-sustaining treat-
ments, consider very relevant respect for patients’ autonomy, allow indirect 
euthanasia or even consent to “assisting dying”.220 There is a clear trend, at 
least among the Continental European and Common Law tradition countries, 
towards an increasing respect for the right to self-determination of the patient. 
Twenty-six surveys carried out between 1980 and 1989 in fourteen countries 
have all revealed that the majority of persons are in favour of active euthanasia 
(from 56% to 84%).221 Another set of twenty-two surveys carried out with 
physicians has exposed that about 40% of them has been confronted with a re-
quest for euthanasia and a fifth to a third of them has acceded to the request.222 
Furthermore, in many countries such as Finland223, France224, Germany225, 
                                                 
219  Cit. in José Alves, op. cit., p. 34. 
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Spain226, UK227 and USA (other than the case of Oregon)228, common prac-
tices could very well be equally considered to constitute, to say the least, pas-
sive euthanasia. The clear and dangerous difference that exists between the 
first and this group of countries is that these practices take place without any 
regulation or control. We are assisting to a complex social game, where legal 
and medical terminology and language in general are manipulated and euphe-
misms are invented in order to accommodate bad moral consciences and avoid 
political unrest. Hypocrisy reigns.229  
As Freeman sums up, if euthanasia were licit:230 
a) more individuals would be allowed a “good death”, a death with dignity, 
quick and without pain and suffering; 
b) embryos and foetuses now aborted, because of the possibility or probabil-
ity of a severe defect, would survive if they were found to be free of the 
defect; 
c) more vigorous initial therapy could be used without the fear by physi-
cians, family, and patients that the patient might be forced to survive in an 
unsatisfactory, limbo-like state; 
d) controls could be imposed on the decision-making process to assure that 
the decisions were reasonable and tolerable – in contrast to the current se-
cret, sometimes arbitrary, decision-making process that now goes on be-
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tween a patient’s family and the physician; 
e) its legalisation could incorporate appropriate controls and review, controls 
that are lacking in our current decision-making process. 
There is no doubt that both the medical profession and public opinion have 
been moving towards legalising euthanasia. Dramatic cases of AIDS pa-
tients231, the decline of medical paternalism and the distance gained from reli-
gious obscure perspectives are other reasons that force us all to review our po-
sition. Those who follow a religion are free to practice it without requiring 
those who do not to act the same way. Besides that, there is an abyssal differ-
ence between illegality and religious immorality. If law is a social regulation 
that exists to minimise inconsistency and unpredictability, then it should for-
mulate rules in order to control euthanasia taking place in hospitals throughout 
the whole world already and to avoid individual ad hoc decisions. Euthanasia 
has always existed and always will, at least in the patient-doctor relation, no 
matter what the penal or civil law say about it. If we subject euthanasia to a set 
of requirements, then we will be able to subject anyone who commits abuses to 
adequate and suitable criminal, civil and disciplinary responsibility.  
Many of the cases that call for euthanasia are actually originated by the 
medical insistence of prolonging life of irreversible coma states and by reani-
mation processes that should not even have been started. Chances of improve-
ment are in many of these cases basically non-existent; therefore, these situa-
tions should be avoided from the start in order to save the families and medical 
personnel from psychological distress and legal dilemmas. When these situa-
tions are not avoided, no one should be further penalised because of bad 
judgements or insufficient time for a more reasonable decision. Therefore, if a 
reanimation attempt or the use of a life-saving machine resulted in a vegetative 
state or the prolonging of unbearable pain, doctors, families and patients 
should be allowed to suspend the life-saving mechanism and even ask for a le-
thal injection. The ultimate goal of medicine should eventually no longer be 
perceived as prolonging life, but promoting the well being and eliminating suf-
fering. Although saving lives should remain the guiding principle, it should 
yield to compassion and respect for the self-determination of the patient.232 
Lawyers, as well, should gain more sensibility for medical ethical issues in or-
der to allow for a more fruitful exchange of ideas, efficient prevention of con-
flicts and better solutions. 
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Euthanasia is, at the end, a problem of conscience, for which some do too 
little and others do too much. Either way, we cannot forget a basic postulate: 
the concept of death should always be kept at a high dignity level and it is an 
eminently personal and intimate moment, the patient’s will being the key 
thought in all this process. We have to respect someone who thinks that there 
is no point in living if one’s life is filled with constant and excruciating pain or 
if an incurable and terminal disease prevents a meaningful or significant life. 
We have to protect each individual’s freedom to maximal desire satisfaction as 
long as no one else’s equal freedom is violated. Therefore, a person’s explicit 
death wish can make it right to respect his/her freedom by taking his/her life. 
When thinking of a title to this article, many different alternatives came to 
my mind: Euthanasia: “From the right to life to the right over life?”, “The right 
to death?”, “The right over death?”. All these possibilities seem to entail some 
truth in them, as well as so many potential legal and ethical problems. How-
ever, that should not prevent us from continuing to move from a sacral and af-
flicted view of life to a quality-oriented concept of life.233 Saving people is al-
ways right, but not letting them live with dignity and being obsessed with the 
mere biological survival is wrong. We should also rethink our traditional atti-
tudes towards death. It cannot continue to be seen as always necessarily bad, 
for which someone has to be punished when inflicting it on another. Life is not 
so sanctified that it should be preferred to any death. Let us be more realistic 
about our biological functions. We cannot leave the process of dying to chance 
and progressive disintegration of the body anymore. 
                                                 
233  In fact, more than having to choose between sanctity or quality of life, our society 
should conjugate the best of both in the most harmonic way possible, see A. Eser, 
“Entre la sanctidad y la calidad de vida”, Anuario de Derecho Penal, 1984, pp. 747 ff., 
cit. in M. Casado Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 17.  
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